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FRENCH AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL CULTURES AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
• Emmanuelle Jouannet 
"We cannot extract ourselves from our traditions but the manner in which we 
follow them depends on us." 
-JOrgen Habermas 1 
I want to begin my consideration of French and American perspectives on 
international law by addressing more generally the question of the relationship between 
legal culture and international law in order to broadly contextualize the descriptions 
of French and American perspectives on international law that are the subject of this 
Article. I would like to stress at the outset that it seems to me that there does not exist 
any global or cosmopolitan vision of international law, but, on the contrary, an 
inevitable multiplicity of particular national, regional, individual, and institutional 
visions. This is so because the actors in the international arena are conditioned by their 
own legal cultures and not by a cosmopolitan legal culture, which at present does not 
really exist. To be sure, there certainly exists a common language, which is inter-
national law itself, and in this sense a common embryonic culture,2 but this language 
is expressed through individual voices that are the products of particular, diverse legal 
cultures. 3 
This state of affairs is particularly striking today. It is reinforced by multiple 
pluralist and multicultural claims in the face of an increasingly global international 
society. 4 It is also the result ofa new understanding oflaw, which sees it as rooted in 
culture and language. We might say that at present both factual and doctrinal 
considerations are leading to a new awareness of the need to see international law in 
its historical and cultural contexts. This is, however, a complex situation with both 
advantages and disadvantages. 
As is clear from the current practice of international law, the existence of different 
legal cultures and of the different ways of envisioning international law, which results 
• Professor, Universite Paris I (Pantheon-SorboMe). This article was translated from the French by 
Martin A. Rogoff. This Article is based on a presentation made at Harvard Law School for the colloquium 
"Comparative Visions of Global Public Order," May 5-6, 2005, organiz.ed by the Harvard Law Review and 
Professor David Kennedy, Director of the European Law Research Center. I want to thank Nathaniel 
Berman, Alexandre Lorite Escorihuela, Martti Koskenniemi, and David KeMedy for their very stimulating, 
critical comments on this study. 
I. JORGEN HABERMAS, DEL 'USAGE PUBLIC DES !DEES: ECRITS POLmQUES 1990-2000 at 5 (2005). 
2. See Robert Y. JeMings, An International Lawyer Takes Stock, 39 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 513, 526 
(1990). 
3. This statement is based on the idea that a culture is transmitted by means of a language, which in 
tum reacts with it, but that it is also an integral component of the existence of a society. EDGAR MORIN, 
LA METHODE: LES IDEES, TOME 4 at 18 (1991 ). Perhaps we can at least maintain that this is true in the sense 
of a "cultural tradition." On this point, see JEAN-PIERRE W ARNJER, LA MONOIALISA TJON DE CULTURE 7 (3d 
ed. 2004). 
4. ARGUN APPADURAI, APRES LE COLONJALJSME: LES CONSEQUENCES CULTURELLES DE LA 
GLOBALISATION (2001). 
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from these cultures, does not by any means foreclose the possibility of thinking about 
the bridges that might exist between cultures and about the points of convergence 
which might unite them around a common set of norms. By its very function, 
international law requires real interaction between different legal traditions by means 
of mutual reception of norms more or less freely agreed to. Furthermore, to recognize 
the diversity and a certain irreducibility of legal cultures can be quite positive, 
especially when it permits us to take into account the different cultural contexts in 
which international law exists, thus allowing us to better understand our divergences 
in interpretation and application of international law, as well as the more general 
problem of interpretation itself. 5 
But these diverse historical and cultural contexts within which international law 
is situated also present a risk, one with which we are presently confronted. In periods 
of great instability, like that which exists today, these differences are often used to 
reinforce antagonisms and interpretations in direct opposition to international law by 
creating conceptions of international law that are no longer national, but nationalist 
and/or imperialist. These diverse antagonisms and interpretations go so far as to 
produce a profound uncertainty in the secondary rules of the international system or 
even in its fundamental principles. This can completely destabilize the system without 
bringing to it a new, really satisfying solution, since the nationalist conception tends 
to reject the common model and the imperialist conception seeks to unilaterally impose 
its own model. That said, however, these periods of crisis are not totally negative for 
they do not create these problems ex nihilo, but rather reveal in a brutal but necessary 
way the dilemmas and the deadlocks that are inherent in the presently-existing 
international legal system itself and in the different perceptions that people have of the 
system. In so doing, these dilemmas and deadlocks oblige us to do something about 
them.6 
Are not Franco-American differences with respect to international law, at least at 
first sight, the perfect example of different and opposed cultural perspectives on 
international law? Is it not evident that international law does not have the same 
significance and does not have the same meaning for a Frenchman or an American, 
because each perceives it only through his own legal culture and consistent with a 
conception oflaw which sometimes is in direct opposition to that of the other? To be 
sure, Americans and the French agree much more often than one sometimes thinks, 7 
but their cultural perspectives, at the same time both similar and different, can give way 
to the radicalized positions of contending rivals. 8 And even ifwe can laugh at the idea 
that Americans might take a position based on what the French think, because 
Americans are so focused on their own internal concerns and are for the most part 
5. For an in-depth consideration of contextualization, see Oun KORHONEN, INTERNATIONAL LAw 
SITUATED: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAWYER'S STANCE TOWARDS CULTURE, HISTORY AND COMMUNITY 
(2000). 
6. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Empire(s) of International Law: System Change and Legal 
Transformation, 8 AUSTRIAN REV. INT'L & EUR. L. 61-68 (2003). 
7. See LAURENT COHEN-T ANUGI, L'EUROPE ET AMERIQUE AU SEUIL DU XXIe SIECLE 201 (2004). 
8. On the general French view of the United States, see L'AMERIQUE DANS LES TETES: UN SIECLE DE 
FASCINATIONS ETD' AVERSIONS (Lacome et al. eds. 1986); RICHARD KUISEL, LE MIRROIR AMERICAIN: 50 
ANS DE REGARD FRANCAIS UR AMERIQUE (1990); PHILIPPE ROGER, L'ENNEMI AMERICAIN: GENEALOGIE 
DEL' ANTIAMERICAJNISME FRANCAJS (2002). 
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uninterested in what others think, I have to say, based on my observations of what 
happens in France, that periods of crisis revive old antagonisms. Let us take the recent 
example of the adoption, in October 2005, of the Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Diversity by UNESCO. The American ambassador to the organization called 
it a "bad idea," 9 while France, represented by its President, became the most active 
spokesman for it. According to the American Edwin D. Williamson, who was 
undoubtedly expressing the general opinion in his country, it was a "bad idea" to create 
the International Criminal Court, while the great majority of French people, on the 
contrary, saw it as a positive step forward. 10 Besides, does not the United States 
Department of Justice deem the way in which the majority of judges on the United 
States Supreme Court take foreign judicial decisions into consideration to be an 
"imminent attack by marauding members of the French Supreme Court[?]" 11 And what 
should we say about the direct confrontation in the Security Council before the second 
invasion of Iraq, where the two camps were represented by the French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Dominique de Villepin, and the American Secretary of State, Colin 
Powell, which was without doubt the most highly publicized media event in the 
diametrically opposed perspectives of the two countries? 
It might be objected that the Franco-American division only reproduces on a 
smaller scale the division between Europe and the United States, and that in itself it is 
without real interest. Although the divide between Europe and the United States is 
certainly similar to that existing between France and the United States, it would, 
however, be profoundly reductive to obscure Franco-American differences for that 
reason. For the present, the internal divisions in Europe between the "old" and the 
''young" Europe prevent a clear understanding of what might be a "European 
perspective" on international law, into which a French perspective would be integrated. 
The emergence of Europe has without doubt contributed to amalgamating a French 
perspective on international law into a more general European perspective. But, 
although the legal cultures of European nations intersect somewhat in a European view 
of international law, a European perspective lacks coherence, is difficult to define or 
describe, and is in any case quite changeable. Also, neither the Europe under 
construction (the European Union), nor common ways of thinking, nor shared values 
can preclude, for the time being, the continuation of different cultural and linguistic 
contexts at the national level in which particular visions of international law are rooted. 
Moreover, the Franco-American divide is both specific and exemplary in itself, 
because it is much simpler to see than the divide between Europe and the United 
States. Whatever the manifest imbalance in power, it matches two states having two 
historically-based national perspectives. For that reason, they are distinct and easily 
9. See Helene Ruiz-Fabri, Is the Nature of the International Legal System Changing? A Reply, 8 
AUSTRIAN REV. OF INT'L & EUR. L. 179 (2003 ). 
10. Edwin D. Williamson,Rea/ism versus Legalism in International Relations, 96 AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L 
L. PROCEEDINGS 262 (2002). 
11. Humorous and bitter observation by Deborah Pearlstein, intended to illustrate the aggressive 
position of the United States Department of Justice with regard to the willingness of some Justices to take 
into consideration certain foreign judicial decisions, not as precedent, but only for information. See 
Deborah Pearlstein, Who's Afraid of International Law? Conservative Disdain for International Law and 
Judicial Deliberation is Reaching New Heights, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (ONLINE EDITION), Apr. 5, 
2005, http://www.prospect.org. 
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identified. I am well aware that to speak of "national" perspectives in this respect 
might seem problematic and fraught with presuppositions. But it is not a question here 
of defending some romantic vision of the nation-state or of obscuring all those 
contemporary phenomena, which relativize the national context. Nor is it a question 
of reducing the legal culture of each of the two countries to the idea of a national 
culture. 12 It is simply to recognize the persistence of the phenomenon of national 
identity within France and the United States, an identity that is linked to a particular 
culture and to a particular perspective on international law.13 Not to recognize this 
identity would be to deny an important aspect of reality that consists in the "para-
doxical resistance" of the national idea at the time of globalization 14 and its impact on 
Franco-American differences concerning law; for it inevitably consolidates and 
reinforces the positions of each nation and their cultural identities. In addition, even 
if this study is limited to national cultural perspectives, we must bear in mind that the 
problem is considerably broader and includes the question of the recognition of 
multiple cultures that are infra-, trans-, and supra-national. 
Finally, this confrontation of French and American perspectives on international 
law is all the stronger since neither of these visions is content to remain withdrawn 
within itself. Very much to the contrary, each of our two countries clearly prides itself 
on its particular vision of international law and claims that it incarnates a model 
susceptible of being adapted to the entire world. By virtue of their histories and their 
own cultures, each of these two legal visions has a tendency to extend to the global 
level in ways that often intersect and conflict. As Andre Kaspi has remarked: 
[B]etween the French and the Americans the commonalities are not lacking. What 
unites them separates them. Here are two nations which both have the calling to 
embody the great aspirations of humanity .... Two nations which, however, at the 
dawn of the third millennium do not have the same weight. America is surprised that 
France can have the same ambitions as it does. France is no longer the beacon of 
humanity and believes that the United States has stolen that role from it.15 
It is certainly true that today there is the potential for an evolution, which can transcend 
the Franco-American division because the stakes are so high. For instance, either we 
remain at the level of deliberately competing models or we see that there is the 
possibility of a harmonization, albeit without unification, of our different traditions 
around a legal culture that is in part common to both countries. Would not that only 
12. The very notion of the nation-state as a concept of cultural identity is illegitimate in the United 
States according to JACQUES PORTES, Qu-est ce que la culture americaine, in ETAS-UNIS, PEUPLE ET 
CULTURE 160 (2004), who revisits the well-known work of Anthony D. Smith on the "ethnic renaissance" 
in the United States. The idea ofa national culture is an idea deconstructed by modem social science. See, 
e.g., DENYS CUCHE, LA NOTION DE CULTURE DANS LES SCIENCES OCIALES 88 et seq. (2004); Sally Engle 
Merry, Anthropology, Law and Transnational Processes, 21 ANN. REV. OF ANTHROPOLOGY 357 (1992); 
Carol J. Greenhouse, Perspectives anthropolgiques sur l'americanisation du droit, 45 ARCHIVES DE 
PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 44 (2001); ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT {2000). 
13. H.PATRICKGLENN,LEGAL TRAoITIONSOFTHEWORLD:SUSTAINABLEDIVERSITYINLAW{2000). 
14. Alain Renaud, Les deux logiques de l'idee de nation, in CAHJERS DE PHILOSOPHIE JURIDIQUES: 
ETAT ET NATION 10 { 1988). 
15. ANDRE KAsPJ, LES ETATS-UNJS D' AUJOURD'HUI: MAL CONNUS, MAL COMPRIS, MAL ARMES, 315 
(1999). 
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be a confirmation of our ability to draw on the heritage of 1945 and of the 1960s and 
1970s to confront the problems of the present? Does that heritage, admittedly 
seriously burdened by its own insufficiencies and distorted by the contradictory 
rationales, whether nationalist or even imperialist, of the cultural legal models of each, 
deserve to be sacrificed? Given our different cultural conceptions ofinternational law 
that at times engender profound misunderstandings, is not our common heritage, both 
historic and cultural, which aims at subjecting international relations to the rule oflaw 
to eliminate violence, still sufficiently alive in our memories and our lived experience 
so as not to be totally squandered in the name of the necessities of particular policies 
of this government or that? If we are capable of working together to adapt our 
common heritage to contemporary needs, no longer underestimating our own legal 
cultures through which we view international law, but at the same time rejecting the 
radical exclusivity of one vision or another, might not our common heritage provide 
a sufficient basis for the resolution of our disagreements? 16 
It seems to me that the present international legal system is threatened with 
disappearance, not only because of its internal dysfunctions, but also because of the 
international context of post-Cold War destabilization, which encourages competition 
between different national and cultural visions that all make claims to be valid 
models. 17 Some will regret this while others will see in it the possibility for the 
emergence of new forms of world governance. Whatever view one has of the matter, 
however, it seems to me that a large part of the debate revolves around the possibility 
ofresolving the contradiction between a formalist, internationalized, even globalized, 
vision oflaw, on the one hand, and diverse, particular legal visions on the other. We 
need to analyze these distinct cultural legal models to understand what legal ideas and 
values are expressed by each of them. A schematic presentation of the French and 
American models can perhaps help us to make such a comparison if one goes about it 
in a dispassionate way. That is to say, we must try to understand the irreducible part 
of each legal culture and the truth, which inheres in it judged by its own criteria, and 
we must try to better understand the force fields and true divisions, which form around 
and are expressed in terms of contemporary international law, and in so doing 
disregard political posturing and the espousal of extreme political strategies. 
As I will try to demonstrate, the simplified images that one has of the views of the 
other create a static Franco-American divide, which derives from our different legal 
traditions and which produces effects in practice. Also, these simplified images often 
reveal "the shortcomings of our own culture or our ignorance of it as well as the 
prejudices that we have toward the other," 18 and they cannot avoid betraying the 
existence of a certain ambivalence in the positions taken on the two sides of the 
16. For a general consideration on this point, which goes beyond cultural divisions, see the remarkable 
presentation by Pierre-Marie Dupuy, L 'Unite de I 'ordre juridique international, 297 RECUEIL DES COURS 
DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 33 (2002). For a presentation of the question of the 
compatibility of international legal cultures in historical perspective, see Benedict Kingsbury, Confronting 
Difference: The Puzzling Durability of Gentili 's Combination of Pragmatic Pluralism and Normative 
Judgment, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 713 (1998). 
17. Marti Koskenniemi, International Legislation Today: Limits and Possibilities, 23 WIS. INT'L L. 
J. 61 (2005). 
18. Elisabeth Zoller, L 'americanisation du droit constitutionnel: Prejuges et ignorances, in 
L'AMERICANISATION DU DROIT 78 (2001). 
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Atlantic. Moving towards a more dynamic understanding of legal cultures can com-
pensate for the reductive aspect of a static presentation and allow us to evaluate more 
precisely their scope and effects. The ultimate question, which is present throughout 
this study, is the following: supposing that the static and dynamic descriptions of 
Franco-American differences are significant-whatever the fundamental substantive 
content of these differences actually is-can the Americans and the French transcend, 
at least in part, their own legal tradition of conceiving international law and their own 
cultural vision of international law to enter into a real inter-cultural dialogue? And if 
yes, to what degree and in what manner? 
I. STATIC DESCRIPTION OF THE FRANCO-AMERICAN DIVIDE AND 
DIFFERENCE OF LEGAL CULTURES 
A. Legal Culture, Models, and Cultural Stereotypes 
By legal culture, I refer to one of its most classic meanings as ''the values and 
attitudes which tie together the system and which determine the place of the legal 
system in the society considered as a whole." 19 Legal culture is both internal and 
external, as Lawrence Friedman has shown,20 that is to say, internal to the professional 
legal world and external as it encompasses all members of the society. The two 
comprise a set of common principles, values, and concepts, a shared discourse and 
practice, maintained by the modes of teaching and thought of each country or region 
of the world, and which are a part ofa particular tradition ofthought. 21 
It is undeniable that general culture itself--politics, religion, national interests, 
economic and geo-strategic considerations, and raison d'Etat-is at the heart of these 
national visions as well as of the external legal policies that flow from them, and that 
they influence the legal culture of each country. The three examples cited in the 
19. DICTJONNAIRE ENCYCLOPEDIE D THEORIE T DE SOCIOLOGIE DU DROIT 141 (Andre-Jean Arnaud 
ed., 2d ed. I 993 ). On relations between civilizations, cultures, and legal thought, see also ANDRE-JEAN 
ARNAUD, POUR UNE PENSEE JURIDIQUE UROPEENNE 21 (1991); YADH BEN ACHOUR, LE ROLE DES 
CIVILISATIONS DANS LE SYSTEME INTERNATIONAL (DROIT ET RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES) (2003). 
20. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 223-67 (1975). 
Contemporary works are extremely numerous and often relativize, and rightly so, the distinction between 
internal and external culture. Certain authors study the impact of culture in general, others stress the notion 
oflegal culture. See, e.g., Adda B. Bozeman, American Policy and the Illusion of Congruent Values, in 
STRATEGIC REVIEW 11-23 (1987); WERNER LEVI, LAW AND POLITICS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 135 
(1976); James Piscatori & Moorhead Wright, Cultural Diversity and International Law: Problems of 
Normative Order in International Relations, in COMMUNITY: DIVER.SITY AND A NEW WORLD ORDER: 
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF INNJSL. CLAUDE 21-45 (Kenneth w. Thompson ed., 1994); ManoharL. Sarin, The 
Asian-African States and the Development of International Law, in THIRD WORLD A mTUDES TOW ARDS 
INTERNATIONAL LAw: AN INTRODUCTION 33 (F .E. Snyder & s. Sathirathai eds., 1987); R.J. Vincent, The 
Factor of Culture in the Global International Order, in YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS 252-62 (1980); 
Alejendro M. Garro, On Some Practical Implications of the Diversity of Legal Cultures for Lawyering in 
the Americas, 64 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 461 (I 995); Alison Dundes Renteln, Cultural Bias in International Law, 
92 AM. Soc'v OF INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 232 (1998). 
21. This notion of legal culture is clearly a western one for it denotes the ascendancy of law---and of 
a certain conception of Jaw-within a society, which has not always been necessarily shared. See 
CHRISTOPH EBERHARD, ROITS DE L'HOMME T DIALOGUE INTERCUL TUREL 118-19 (2002); Robert Vachon, 
L 'etude du plura/isme juridique-une approche diatopique et dialogale, 29 J. LEGAL PLURALISM &
UNOFFICIAL L. 163, 164 (1990). 
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introduction-cultural diversity, the International Criminal Court, and the use of 
force-are perfect examples of the constant interaction among these different factors. 
It would therefore be patently absurd to equate American and French conceptions of 
international law with their own legal cultures alone. It is interpretative pluralism, 
recommended in his time by Raymond Aron, 22 which seems to me the only approach 
that avoids the dogmatism of particular interpretations and offers the key to a real 
understanding of the legal positions of the two countries. But it would impoverish 
analysis to deny the influence of a separate legal culture and to consider that it is only 
a general cultural model, or a political, economic, and social model, which places the 
two countries in opposition to each other; or that their differences result only from the 
interplay of those interests and power relations on which the media focus their 
attention. It is also their different legal models, arising from their own traditions of 
thought, which separate them. To be more precise, it is their particular perspectives 
on rules of international origin (whether they seek to govern international, trans-
national, or domestic relations) which create divisions between the two countries. The 
particular perspective which each country has on international law must itself be 
distinguished from existing positive law in the strict sense so as to distinguish the 
content of positive law from the cultural, practical, and professional contexts in which 
it operates and in the prism of which it is interpreted. 23 In so doing, legal culture acts 
for the most part subconsciously, which makes it so difficult to identify. Even to want 
to talk about it is to presuppose that one's selfis detennined by a legal culture and that 
legal culture continues to produce effects on us. 24 
What are, then, the two legal cultures of the United States and France? How 
should we identify them here? Undoubtedly, we have to start with some history and 
return to the the 18th century French and American revolutions which have marked our 
two countries, and the world, with imprints both common and opposed. 25 
Contemporary descriptions of law in France and the United States are rooted in their 
histories, their general cultures, their religions, and their deeply-held moral doctrines, 
and are reinforced by the broader philosophic orientations· of empiricism and 
rationalism which exist historically on both sides of the Atlantic.26 
22. RAYMOND ARON, LE SPECTATEUR ENGAGE 247-63 (1981). 
23. Matthias Reimann, Droit positif et culture juridique. L 'americanisation du droit europeen par 
reception, in L'AMERJCANISATION DU DROIT 64 (2001); see also L. Cadiet, L'hypothese de 
I 'americanisation de la justice fran~aise: Mythe et rea/ite, in L' AMERJCANJSA TION DU DROIT 90 (stressing 
the difference to be established between reality and practice on the one hand and the discourse of ideas on 
the other). 
24. The idea is that Americans and the French think and act unconsciously within the context of 
paradigms "culturally inscribed in them." See generally supra note 5, at 213 ( discussing paradigms more 
generally). I do not pursue these matters here. 
25. Alain Renaut, Revolution americaine, revolution fran~aise, in HJSTOIRE DE LA PHJLOSOPHIE 
POLmQUE, Tome 4 LES CRITIQUES DE LA MODERNITE POLmQUE 21-36 (1999). 
26. PIERRE LEGRAND, LE DROIT COMPARE 88-89 (1999); MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM AND 
POLITICS 61-70 (1962). The common bases of this opposition are found also at the heart of philosophy, 
CHRJSTIAN DESCAMPS, LA PENSEE SINGULIERE DE SARTRE A DELEUZE: QUARANTE ANS DE PHIWSOPHIE N 
FRANCE 28 (2003); and of American legal thought, MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION F 
AMERJCAN LAW, 1870-1960: TuE CRJSJS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY ( 1992). 
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But it is evidently impossible to retrace here the complex evolution of these two 
legal-political traditions. Therefore, I will deliberately proceed otherwise by outlining, 
in the form of two models, what seem to me to be the principal fundamental aspects of 
the cultural background of the two countries as it relates to their conception of 
international law today. This first consideration requires more precision. First, it is 
clear that being both French and an international lawyer, I bring to the task my own 
subjectivities and personal background; all the more so since I do not intend to refrain 
from focusing critically on the prejudices and stereotypes that each has of the other. 
In addition, the models that I intend to describe will be presented as the "dominant" 
models within each culture, that is to say, as the model which predominates in 
American and French legal cultures. In so doing, I am certainly aware that each 
dominant model coexists with other, more minor, forms oflegal culture, which are also 
known in the other country-even if only in a simplified and static cultural model of 
the other. Furthermore, this connection to international law is necessarily experienced 
less concretely and more at a distance for most French and American people, so I 
intend to focus my consideration on legal professionals and the political and 
institutional actors in the area of international law in the two countries to situate the 
cultural characteristics of their discourse. But since internal legal culture and external 
legal culture remain in constant interaction, I will employ the terms ''the Americans" 
and "the French" in an imprecise way, all the while knowing that such an approach 
necessarily smoothes over differences internal to each culture. I am also fully aware 
that this is an undertaking doomed to failure if one seeks in this way to describe an 
objective reality. That is why I intend only to look at the Franco-American division 
subjectively, as producing a "mirror-effect" where each failing in the tradition of the 
other highlights characteristics of its own. That is to say that, without being an 
incorrect portrayal of French or American legal culture, the Franco-American binary 
division that I am going to try to describe will necessarily be stereotypical, for it is 
meant to be an encapsulation of subjective representations, conscious or unconscious, 
that each presently has of the other and of itself because of its own legal tradition. Is 
this not what often rallies Americans to one side and the French to the other when there 
is a crisis between the two countries? Is it not their latent hostility with respect to the 
representation that they have of the legal model of the other which is presented as a foil 
or counter-model, which pushes them to insist on the virtues of their own representa-
tion?27 And is this not true even though they are aware of the multiple currents and 
tendencies which run through their own tradition? 
This being said, I propose a dominant model of American legal culture as judicial, 
realist, and pragmatic, and a dominant model of French legal culture as legalistic, 
positivist, and formal. These differences between legal models, which are historically 
situated and rooted in the legal traditions of the two countries, have two consequences 
when projected to the international level: first, internal legal models are transposed to 
the international level; and, second, these internal legal models conflict with an 
internationalist model. This exacerbates, in a way, the Franco-American divide. Given 
the necessity to limit this study, I will, however, describe only the first division and will 
develop only the second. 
27. CHRISTOPHE JAMIN & PHILIPPE JEST AZ, LA DOCTRINE 296 (2004). 
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B. Differences in Franco-American Internal Law 
Projected to the International Level 
[Vol. 58:2 
The least publicized aspect of our differences is our different conceptions of 
domestic law. And yet it is without doubt more suggestive, subtle, and significant, 
during this time of globalization, because it results in an unrelenting struggle between 
the two legal traditions for influence at the international level. 28 And this difference 
certainly exerts an influence on the second division that we will soon explore. What 
is involved here is the continuous "selling" of each national legal model in order to 
influence.the establishment of international norms and institutions that reflect the 
principles of the Anglo-Saxon tradition or the continental French tradition.29 We 
know, for example, that in private international law the American common law is 
expanding its influence thanks to the increase in international private ordering 
arrangements brought about by globalization and the technological and technical 
innovations, principally north-American;- that accompany it (bioethics, computer 
science, etc.). 30 Of course, we are also familiar with the struggle for influence in public 
international law between the two models in matters which pertain to international 
criminal tribunals, the drafting of the decisions of international courts, the role of the 
judge, unwritten law, and the adoption of multilateral or bilateral conventions. 
This real opposition at the internationaHevel is rooted unsurprisingly in the great 
legal traditions of the two countries: the French civil law tradition and the American 
mixed tradition of common law and civil law.31 These traditions still shape the legal 
mentalities of the great majority of American and Frenchmen within the two societies. 
It seems evident that the two traditions also have repercussions on the conceptions that 
the French and Americans have of international law, even if these conceptions take 
shape only in the middle ground between domestic legal culture and the specific 
arrangements ofinternational society, as well as in the multiple currents of thought that 
cut through the profession on the two sides of the Atlantic. We must then identify 
28. For example, consider the influence large American Jaw firms have on the transformation of 
national legal cultures. Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin 
Resistance, 10 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 382 (2003). See also Conseil d'Etat, RAPPORT SUR 
L'INFLUENCE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT FRANCAIS (2001). 
29. ANTOINE GARAPON & IOANNIS PAPADOPOULOS, JUGER EN AMERIQUE T EN FRANCE: CULTURE 
JURIDIQUE FRANCAISE ET COMMON LAW 289 passim (2003). 
30. Bernard Audit, L 'AMERICANISATION DU DROIT 9 (200 l ); E. Allan Farnsworth, Mythes OU realites, 
in L'AMERICANISATION DU DROIT 22 (2001); H. Muir Watt, Propos /iminaires sur le prestige du modele 
americain, in L'AMERICANISATION DU DROIT 35 (2001). 
31. On the two traditions of civil Jaw and common law, see J.H. BAKER, THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION: LAWYERS, BOOKS AND THE LAw(2000); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 
(2d ed. 1985); LEGRAND,supra note 26, at 87 passim. On the civil law tradition in France, see ANDRE-JEAN 
ARNUAD, LES ORIGINES DOCTRINALES DU CODE CIVIL FRANCAIS (1969); JOHN BELL, FRENCH LEGAL 
CUL TURES (LA w IN CONTEXT) (William Twining & Christopher McCrudder eds., 200 l ). On the anglo-
saxon paradigm, see LEGRAND, supra note 26, at 87. On the American paradigm more specifically, which 
combines common Jaw and civil Jaw elements, see GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LA w I 0 
passim (1977); GLENN, supra note 13, at 250 passim. For broader philosophic perspectives on specific 
aspects of the common law model, see ROGER COTTERRELL, THE POLITICS OF JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION TOLEGAL PHILOSOPHY 22passim ( 1992); Elisabeth Zoller, Etats-Unis (culture juridique), 
in DICTIONNAIRE DE LA CULTURE JURIDIQUE 656 (S. Rials & D. Alland eds., 2003). 
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Franco-American differences about international law by examining the legal cultures 
of international lawyers that have developed in France and the United States. 
C. Franco-American Differences Regarding International Law 
The second legal division between France and the United States is much more 
obvious and highly publicized than the first. It does not involve the promotion of a 
domestic model at the international level, but rather the defending of one's own 
particular conception of international law. We are aware that today this endeavor 
arouses high emotions, but in any case it has. always been a ground for discussion, 
misunderstandings, and sometimes lively debate between the two countries. It seems 
to me that the opposition between the legalistic and formalistic French tradition and the 
pragmatic and realist American tradition asserts itself here in a much more clear-cut 
manner. 32 Even though Americans question pragmatism as a school of thought, on the 
importance that it has in the United States, and on its relationship with realism, 33 it 
remains that the American conception of international law is perceived-and perceived 
by the majority of Americans-as more pragmatic and realistic than the French 
conception because the American conception is much more concerned with judging the 
validity of international norms and institutions by their effectiveness in practice in a 
concrete environment. As opposed to the pragmatic and realist American conception, 
whether it be liberal, leftist, or conservative, the French conception may be defined as 
legalistic, systematic, and formal, and focused on respect for existing rules as 
established according to the formal procedures prescribed by the system. Of course 
in France, too, the formalist, positivist view can be criticized or presented in a more 
nuanced form, but it still seems to me to be the dominant model for conceptualizing 
international law. 
Presented in a very general manner, these two conceptions do not necessarily 
appear antagonistic, but rather complementary. In fact, tensions arise between them 
only when they are pushed to extremes, like today. On the American side, realism 
seems to lead to a strictly instrumentalist and skeptical vision oflaw, and on the French 
side formalism seems to lead to an overly rigorous, unrealistic, and dogmatic vision of 
law. For example, according to the French jurist Serge Sur, Americans defend more 
and more openly a model of deregulation of international relations and of de-
legitimization of international institutions which he sees as accompanying a policy of 
hegemony without leadership and without international legitimacy. 34 And the 
32. I am here using the term "realist" in a broad and non-philosophical sense. Also, I am not using it 
in the very precise sense used by David Kennedy in his in-depth works on internationalist doctrine. David 
Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 7 (1994). 
33. See, e.g., Richard H. Steinberg et al., Realism and Legalism, 96 ASIL Proc. 260 (2002) (panel 
discussion among Richard H. Steinberg, Edwin D. Williamson, Stephen D. Krasner, and Andreas Paulus). 
On pragmatism as an element of American culture in its own right, see ADRIEN LHERM, LA CULTURE 
AMERICAINE 73 (2002). 
34. Serge Sur, Imperialism et droit international en Europe et en Amerique, in LE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL ET L'IMPERIALISME ENEUROPE ET AUX ETATS-UNIS (H. Ruiz-Fabri & E. Jounnet eds., 
2006). For an emphatic criticism ofinstrumentalism, see Martti Koskenniemi, What Is International Law 
For?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003). 
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American jurist Richard Pildes denounces what he calls ''the dark side oflegalism" 35 
in emphasizing that the supposed virtues of legalism and legal formalism sometimes 
have unacceptable human and political costs. Ifwe push this analysis a little further, 
there emerges from it the sense of a deep opposition with respect to the recognized 
value of international law as law. International law appears to be discredited by 
Americans 36 while it is highly valued by the French. 37 Concurrently, there is a 
tendency for the French to defend monism with priority accorded to international law 
and an even stronger tendency on the American side to look at the relationship between 
domestic law and international law from a very pronounced dualist perspective (if not 
from a monist perspective with the primacy of internal American law).38 
I would like here to pursue the following idea. It seems to me that Americans are 
posing two questions that are critical for the future of contemporary international law, 
two major concerns that the French can fully understand and share: questions regarding 
the legitimacy and the efficacy of existing international law. But the French and 
Americans do not agree on the manner of posing these questions or on the way to 
resolve them, because they view international law from fundamentally different 
perspectives, principally because of their different legal cultures. 
D. Pragmatism and Realism as the Dominant Model of the Legal Culture of 
American International Lawyers 
Let us begin from the most radical position adopted by certain American jurists. 
The study by Richard Pildes attracted my attention because it expresses perfectly the 
attacks that can be made on French legal formalism. The author seeks to demonstrate 
that the rigid, pre-established, transparent, and general character of international rules, 
what he calls legalism, prevents a real consideration of particular contexts within which 
all international action of an exceptional nature must be appropriately evaluated. Thus, 
for example, the desire to obtain at any price a resolution of the Security Council can 
delay, if not prevent, a humanitarian intervention, and thereby allow an ethnic 
cleansing to take place, such as that which occurred in Kosovo. Similarly, George 
Bush's decree establishing military commissions to try certain categories of"enemy 
combatants" was issued much too precipitously, before knowing exactly the type of 
person who would be apprehended, so that it unnecessarily aroused a flood of criticism 
that would have been limited ifhe had acted after, rather than before, arrests had been 
35. Richard H. Pi Ides, Conflicts Between American and European Views of Law: The Dark Side of 
Legalism, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 145, 148 (2003). Also, for an emblematic presentation of the present 
American position on formalism, see John C. Yoo & Will Trachman, Less than Bargained for: The Use 
of Force and the Declining Relevance of the United Nations, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 379 (2005); Michael F. 
Glennnon, Why the Security Council Failed, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 16 (2003); ROBERT KAGAN, LE REVERS DE 
LA PUISSANCE: LES ETATS-UNIS EN QU~TE DE LEGITIMITE 63 (2003). 
36. Especially by the current conservative movement, which does not even consider it to be law. See, 
e.g., JACK L. GoLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 passim (2005). 
37. See, e.g., Dominique de Villepin, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, speech at the United 
Nations Security Council (Mar. 19, 2003). 
38. For a current discussion of conservative ideas that lead to a dualism of an ontological nature, see 
Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, L 'imperia/isme comme produit derive: une lecture partisame de la doctrine 
intemationaliste contemporaine, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ETL'IMPERIALISME EN EUROPE ET AUX 
ETATS-UNIS (H. Ruiz-Fabri & E. Jouannet eds., 2006). 
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made. In short, the general idea is not to let oneself be seduced by the supposed 
virtues of international legalism and perhaps, at a deeper level, to think that the law is 
able to do everything in international relations, when often it can do nothing at all.39 
It is interesting to observe how the perspective exemplified by Professor Pildes' 
article, over and above its conjectural and doctrinal aspects, expresses certain constants 
of American legal culture. Even if it is deliberately advanced in support of a particular 
policy, it is rooted in the pragmatic legal conception that I have presented as typically 
American, in which one must be able to take into consideration and to evaluate the 
practical consequences of any action and of any norm. This realistic and pragmatic 
perspective is far removed from the prevailing French rationalist perspective, and for 
that reason, often remains largely unrecognized or ignored, if not even at times 
caricatured by the French as materialist and opportunist; even though it simply 
expresses another view of international law that we must understand. One of the 
principal concerns for Americans today is the effectiveness ofinternational law, while 
for the French the concern is primarily that of its existence. Americans are more 
concerned with actual consequences of international norms, and the French are more 
concerned with respect for their modes of production. The rules of international law 
are directly evaluated by Americans as a function of their ability to resolve concrete 
cases; they are specific to a given situation, and the result of pragmatic action. This 
analysis is not inherently surprising, but what is notable about it in this context is that 
it goes to the heart of American legal culture and can go so far as to link, in a way 
unknown in France, validity and effectiveness in the consideration of norms. In a 
certain respect, for Americans, no rule exists which is valid a priori, every rule must 
prove itself, to be defined and refined in its application in specific cases. International 
law, therefore, is primarily what public and private actors make of it, and the ways in 
which they interpret it and apply it in the specific contexts in which they find 
themselves. There is thus a reforming and evolving dimension in the pragmatic 
conception of Americans, which is part of their belief in progress and change40 and 
which contrasts with what is perceived as the conservatism of French formalism, 
charged with maintaining at all cost an existing situation, even if that situation is 
unsatisfactory. 
In line with this pragmatic conception oflaw, one sees reemerge-strikingly in the 
Pildes' study-realist-type considerations, going beyond pragmatism, which reflect one 
of the strongest and most characteristic constants of the culture of American inter-
national lawyers. Born within the discipline of international relations, realism has 
permeated the discipline of international law in the United States in a way that is totally 
unknown in France. It is notable by what has been called rule skepticism, which has 
become commonplace in the American tradition of thought. To briefly describe this 
39. This is true, at least, when applying formal law in exceptional situations. See, e.g., THOMAS M. 
FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS (2002). Cf 
Abraham D. Sofaer, On the Necessity of Pre-emption, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 209, 220 (2003) (noting that the 
strict application of the "standard of necessity" to justify self-defense may lead to paralysis). 
40. See Isabelle Richet, Optimisme et reussite individuelle, in ETA TS-UNIS, PEUPLE ET CULTURE 110 
(2004). For an example' of a moderate American conception, but one which would be perceived as 
dangerous in France, see for example Tom J. Farer, Beyond the Charter Frame: Unilateralism or 
Condominium?, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 359 (2002). 
HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 304 2006
304 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:2 
fundamental element of the professional American culture, one can say that rule 
skepticism develops in several steps. At the outset it is critical of the general nature 
of rules, which are always backward-looking and present a false picture of contem-
porary reality; it then highlights their intrinsically ambivalent meaning; it also stresses 
the fact that there always exist conflicting counter-rules and exceptions to the rules; 
and finally it demonstrates that the rules do not offer any solid basis for action because 
they are always the product of compromises between several desired objectives. 41 In 
its extreme political version, realism (political realism in the field of international 
relations) can go so far as to deny the legal nature of international law, but in its 
moderate legal version (legal realism in the field of international law), it seeks above 
all to lower the level of abstraction and the generality of rules to orient them towards 
more flexibility and subtlety in order to adapt international law to the actors and to 
their actual expectations. 42 Furthermore, there is in this a teleological vision oflaw, 
which goes beyond an exclusive concern for the result. It suggests an analysis of law 
not only in terms of results produced but of ends sought, thus presenting the question 
of whether a particular decision or rule is "good policy," in addition to the question of 
its effectiveness in bringing about a desired result. 
In directing analysis into the paths it does, realism produces long term effects 
within American culture that can be seen today, even in its present form which is more 
adapted to the globalization context.43 The fact is that, for Americans, the international 
legal norm is most often understandable only in relation to the political environment 
in which it is situated (the political stakes, power relationships, governmental 
structures, emergence of new actors, etc.) that collectively determine the behavior of 
actors and account for the rules or sources oflaw that they favor. This results at times 
in according decisive weight to the political and social context as an element of 
interpretation, which can go so far as to considerably enlarge the power to interpret 
existing rules. Reference to the political, economic, and social environments will be 
the only object of study for realists who view international law simply as a political 
fact. Deriving from the same source is also the distrust of Americans for excessive 
abstraction or generality with respect to law. For them, it would only be a sign of an 
intention to impose a code of conduct based on purely logical considerations without 
41. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-
BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991 ). 
42. Compare Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human 
Rights Abuse in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, in THE METHODS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 47, 47-48 (A.M. Slaughter & Steven R. Ratner eds., 2004), with K.W. Abbott, 
International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal 
Conflicts, in THE METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 127, 127-28 (A.M. Slaughter & Steven R. Ratner 
eds., 2004) (presenting two versions of realism). It seems to me that none of the other American approaches 
described (feminist, CLS, TW AIL, International Legal Process) represents the general perspective oflegal 
realism. Significantly, the only positivist approach presented is by two Germans and explicitly criticizes 
legal realism. See Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights 
Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, in THE METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23, 23 (A.M. 
Slaughter & Steven R. Ratner eds., 2004). 
43. See e.g., JAMES N. ROSENAU, TuRBULENCE IN WORLD POLITICS: A THEORY OF CHANGE AND 
CONTINUITY (1990); James M. Rosenau, Les processus de la mondia/isation: Retombees significatives, 
echanges impalpables et symbo/ique subtile, 24 ETUDES INTERNATIONALES 497 (1993). 
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taking into account the objective realities of international economic and political 
relations, because, culturally, Americans do not like grand, formal, pre-determined 
structures and distrust the excessive use of legal categories. 44 
In every tradition of thought a dominant model coexists with minor models. And 
we must not ignore them even in a simplified approach to the dominant model. Thus, 
the French see quite clearly that Americans are necessarily formalistic when they 
discuss and utilize the formal institutions and rules of international law. As Duncan 
Kennedy has so well said, formalism ( or rather the extent of formalism) is tied to two 
things: the extent of necessity to conform to rules and the extent of sanction in case of 
non-conformity. 45 From this perspective, most Americans retain a certain minimum 
of formalism in their conception of international law, even if their extent of necessity 
is much less than that of the French because of their overriding skepticism with respect 
to rules. This residual formalism manifests a minor strand in the legal culture of 
American international lawyers. It is tied, it seems to me, to the simple necessity of 
argument at the international level about rules and institutions, but also to a profoundly 
legalist and procedural domestic tradition, which is much more formalist than that of 
international lawyers.46 So, even if viewed from a static and stereotypical perspective, 
the culture of American international lawyers presents itself in a binary form with a 
dominant realist/pragmatist component, but with a formalist variant that is also an 
integral part of their culture. 47 
We know very well, however, that the dominant, pragmatic, and realist American 
tradition has consequences for the teaching of international law, which in tum main-
tains and deepens this tradition and its skepticism with respect to rules. The teaching 
of international law in the United States is both interdisciplinary and practically 
oriented. Even though American universities are known for their production of a 
multitude of subtle and extremely sophisticated approaches, the teaching oflaw aims 
at the acquisition of practical professional competence. 48 Reasoning is wide-ranging, 
44. 0n the critical legal studies movement, see DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDE OF VIRTUE: 
REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM 348-57 (2004); for liberal thought, see Laurence R. 
Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. 
J. 273 (1997); for the realists, see K.W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and 
the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, in THE METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 
(A.M. Slaughter & Steven R. Ratner eds. 2004). 
45. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formalism, in 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 8634 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Bates eds., 200 I) [hereinafter Legal Formalism]. 
In reality this is only one of the many meanings of formalism described by the author, who has brilliantly 
demonstrated the linkage in time and space of questions of formalism and anti-formalism. See generally 
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); 
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE) (1997). 
46. The American system, to the extent that it is procedurally oriented, may be viewed as formalist. 
See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509 (1988). Present-day ne<reonservatives are 
undoubtedly alone in totally compartmentalizing these two aspects of American legal culture when we 
observe their extreme formalism with regard to internal law and their anti-formalist realism with regard to 
international law. 
4 7. This is true even though the respect of Americans for certain fundamental procedural guarantees, 
like due process, also has a substantive component. However, I do not want to consider these precise 
distinctions, because it is not within the scope of this study. 
48. For a description of the evolution of this approach, see supra note 27, at 274. 
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less based on logic and synthesis than on the analysis and teaching of specific cases. 
Also, the teaching ofinternational law is directly linked to the teaching of international 
relations, 49 economics, literature, psychology, and of course political science. There 
is incontestably an openness of the legal discipline to other disciplines because legal 
and judicial reasoning habitually and deliberately take into account considerations not 
strictly legal or formal, whether they derive, for example, from the moral, sociological, 
psychological, or political domains, or simply are consequentialist. 50 Abuses of 
deductive reasoning are denounced along with formalism, and law teaching tries to 
surmount them by taking a realist and interdisciplinary approach. Different types of 
documents that allow students to take into account the legal actors and to place them 
in their social, political, and economic contexts are emphasized, as are cases. 51 The 
contribution of these other disciplines thus is felt much more naturally and explains 
also that the American conception of law has for many years integrated a law and 
economics perspective-sometimes excessively-a perspective which does not exist 
in France. In this spirit of openness to other perspectives, there are no barriers 
separating the domains of private and public law, so that the domain of international 
law includes the consideration of private as well as public relationships, the 
interrelationships of private actors, transnational commercial relations, and, today, the 
idea of world governance. This leads Americans to reject once again the limitations 
of the French conception of a rigid law, formal or perceived as such, as too strictly 
inter-state, a conception oflaw that is not adaptable to the intermixing of public and 
private legal regimes brought about by globalization. Some of these accusations are 
patently false and stem from caricature, for the French have for a long time modernized 
their vision of international law, as we shall soon see. But it is undeniable that by not 
adopting the public/private division, Americans regard the individual and the private 
actor as occupying a much larger place in international law, which necessarily implies 
that Americans have a different conception of international law.52 The importance 
accorded to the public/private division goes back to underlying conceptions of law. 
These conceptions permeate both the American and French visions of law: private, 
contractual, and liberal for Americans, in which law is a tool for use by private 
individuals just as much as by public actors; public and state-centered, for the French, 
in which law inherently carries the mark of the state. 
Moreover, we should note that American legal culture, and the American 
conception of law and its teaching, exercise a real attraction on French young people 
and practitioners. As H. Muir-Watt explains, 53 it would be misleading to attribute this 
to the sole fact of American hegemony. Such an attraction can be explained in part by 
its realistic, pragmatic, interdisciplinary vision, but also because the law has lost its 
49. On this point which seems to me very important for understanding the teaching of international law 
in the United States, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, et al., International Law and International Relations 
Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367, 367 (1998). 
50. GARAPON & PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 29, at 48. 
51. JAMIN & JESTAZ, supra note 27, at 280. 
52. J. COMBACAU, Statut du droit international et statut des internationalistes: ce qui est et ce qui 
pourrait etre, in ENSEIGNEMENT DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL RECHERCHE ET PRATIQUE 268 (1997) 
(recommending to French internationalists that they "devallelize"). 
53. H. Muir-Watt, Propos /iminaires sur le prestige du modele americain, in L 'AMERICANISATION DU 
DROIT33 (200)). 
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sacred aura (un droit desacra/ise) and is now seen as within everyone's reach. In the 
United States, there exists a real culture of questioning, which exists to a much lesser 
extent in France. 54 Realist thought, especially critiques oflaw (Critical Legal Studies, 
Feminist Jurisprudence, Critical Race Studies, etc.}-critiques that we in France often 
have the tendency to marginalize today out ofignorance of what they represent-have 
led to a "de-sacralization" oflaw because of their challenge to legal rationalism. This 
challenge goes much further than what we in France recognize and manifests the 
capacity of the United States to integrate into its conception oflaw even minority and 
extremely critical elements. 55 In so doing, the American discipline ofintemational law 
appears today to be crisscrossed by many more currents of thought than in France, 
where a positivist conception of international law still largely predominates. 56 
Although significantly reworked in light of contemporary developments, the French 
positivist conception oflaw remains the oldest of the modem approaches and, for that 
reason, can be regarded as embodying old ideas in relation to the modernity and 
inventiveness of the multiple American conceptions. 57 It is this dogmatism of the 
formalist French conception that is indirectly challenged and through it the persistence 
of a scientistic positivism is considered archaic and out of date, privileging the study 
of norms to the neglect of decisions and privileging the state to the neglect of all other 
non-state actors. 58 
E. Formalism and Positivism as the Dominant Model of the Legal Culture of 
French International Lawyers 
It is perfectly true, it seems to me, that the French position remains largely 
formalist and legalistic because of its own legal culture and history. This formalism 
and legalism may shock Americans, when viewed from the perspective of their own 
legal culture, and make French law teaching less attractive, but Americans do not 
always understand, or sometimes forget, what is at stake for the formalist and positivist 
French conception with respect to its own legal tradition. Behind the reproach 
addressed to a too rigid legal formalism, very often lurks the scorn or the suspicion, 
well-anchored it seems in America today, of a hypocritical position that is only an 
expression of weakness. 59 Incarnation par excellence of the "old Europe" and of a 
nation considered to be in decline, France would take refuge behind formal principles 
oflaw, because it no longer has the necessary power to impose its own vision of world 
54. Id. at 33-34. 
55. Id. 
56. The size of the United States also explains this diversity. The uniform methodology of French 
internationalists is most certainly encouraged by the centralized system of recruitment of law professors. 
On this point see the analysis for constitutional Jaw of MICHEL TROPER, POUR UNE THE.ORIE JURJDIQUE DE 
L'ETAT 247 (1994), which is also pertinent to international Jaw. 
57. See SIMMA & PAULUS, supra note 42, at 23. 
58. For a critique of positivism, see Wiessner & Willard, supra note 42, at 52. This epistemological 
and methodical reductionism ofFrench positivism renders it incapable today of understanding the full scope 
of legal phenomena and thus of expressing and communicating it. 
59. KAGAN, supra note 35. It seems to me that this position, clearly expressed by Robert Kagan, 
appears to manifest the general feelings of many Americans, including internationalists, although they may 
not be so blunt. 
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order. 60 In essence, respect for formal law (the Kyoto Protocol, the decision-making 
procedures of the Security Council, or the International Criminal Court, for example) 
is seen by the French as a rampart against the arbitrary action of more powerful states. 
It is perfectly clear that France wants to oblige the United States to adhere to this same 
rule. This is what the French jurist Jean-Marc Sorel rightly calls ''the force of inter-
national law." 61 But it is not only the imbalance of power which explains the French 
position; there is also the strong legal tradition where legality goes together with 
generality and equality. In the French legal tradition, the generality and transparency 
of the rules are of prime importance, so much so that decisions not based on general 
principles appear to be arbitrary. The culture of equality is profoundly rooted in the 
French mentality, while that of equity characterizes the American way ofthinking. 62 
And what Americans call legal formalism is exactly what the majority of the French 
call quite simply 'the law,' that is, the positive international law adopted by the 
subjects of international law in their conventions, their resolutions, and their customs. 
Whatever the ambiguities or contradictions in that law, it is certain that any other 
conception would appear to them particularly dangerous and would be a false 
description of law and the possibilities of ascertaining it. 63 
Moreover, there has undeniably been an evolution of the French tradition oflegal 
positivism, of which Americans seem to be unaware. The former tradition of state 
voluntarism still exists, but it is now frequently integrated into a more general 
conception of international law as an autonomous system of law which includes 
subjects other than states and takes into account the different regimes or sub-systems 
that comprise it. International rules are now considered to constitute a coherent whole 
articulated in the form of a true international legal system ( or as an overlapping of 
systems and orders) and drawing their validity from their formal origin according to 
the rules of the system.64 Furthermore, the question of interpretation has come to 
occupy such an important place in French thinking about international law, because it 
tempers the formalism of the rules and the method of strictly deductive reasoning that 
Americans generally associate with formalism. 65 These developments certainly do not 
60. KAsPI, supra note 15, at 283. 
61. Jean-Marc Sorel, L 'ONU et/ '/RAK: le vii plomb ne s 'est pas transforme en or pur, l 08 R.G.D.I.P. 
845-54 (2004). 
62. I do not want to underestimate the importance in internal culture of equal protection guaranteed by 
the American Constitution, but only to point out the fact that because of their realism, Americans have 
recourse much more often to equity than the French. And do we not very often see within international 
tribunals continental judges express this vision as compared with Anglo-Saxon judges? This is all the more 
interesting to observe when it sometimes leads to fundamental differences in reasoning (e.g., in individual 
opinions) but without the recommended resolution necessarily being different. For more information on 
French judges sitting on the International Court of Justice, see Gilbert Guillaume, Les juges fran9ais a la 
CIJ, in LACOUR INTERNATIONALE DE IUSTICE AL' AUBE DU XXIEME SIECLE: LE REGARD 'UN IUGE 120, 
13 (2003) (focusing on his comment on Judge Gros, who regretted the tum of the Court toward equity). 
63. P. Weil, Vers une normativite relative en droit international, 86 R.G.D.1.P. 5 (1982). 
64. For the most well-developed theory of this conception, see Jean Combacau, Le droit international, 
bric-a-brac OU systeme, 31 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 85 ( 1986). On the evolution of positivism 
in France, see Emmanuelle Jouannet, Regards sur un siecle de doctrine fran9aise du droit international, 
46 A.F.D.I. 14 (2000). 
65. Legal Formalism, supra note 45, at 8635. For a discussion of interpretation in France, see for 
example the classic work, SERGE SUR, L'INTERPRETATION E  DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1974). 
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prevent the general persistence of what I have called legal formalism in contrast with 
realism-formalism in the sense of respect for formally existing rules and for the 
formal processes by which these rules are created-within the French tradition, but 
they do demonstrate that when American critics take aim at the archaic or outmoded 
character of the French legal thought, they often go astray. 
The legal formalism of the French is linked, of course, to their positivist legal 
tradition, even ifupdated. 66 Realism as a school of thought in international relations 
has had very little influence on legal culture and the internationalist discipline in 
France, as demonstrated by the example of the very feeble echo of the ideas of 
Raymond Aron in France, in comparison to the very considerable influence of Hans 
Morgenthau in the United States.67 That does not mean that the French lapse into 
idealism or naive optimism, as I will explain later, for they consider their positivistic 
approach as fundamentally realistic. But their realism, which is primarily of a 
methodological type, does not at all lead them to the same conclusions as American 
legal realism. Formalist French positivism requires maintaining a strict distinction 
between law and non-law, not because of a persnickety dogmatism as Americans might 
think, but in order to maintain the predictability and security inherent in the legal rule, 
in contrast with the political decision or the moral or religious rule. From this point 
of view, the French certainly consider themselves to be much more realistic than the 
Americans. Basically, if one limits oneself to the profession, it is interesting to see 
how much the Americans and the French seem to agree on the need to clarify the 
choices to be made on the legal level, but they go about making these choices radically 
differently because they have profoundly different conceptions oflaw: Americans see 
law as an all-encompassing sociological and political phenomenon, while the French 
see it exclusively as a body of rules and principles. Americans consider that one can 
clarify the choices to be made only by situating the law in an approach that includes 
the political, economic, or social context. The French think, on the contrary, that such 
clarification is only possible with the interpretation of the legal rules themselves. Both 
agree also in wanting to improve existing law-while also seeking to differentiate de 
lege lata and de /ege ferenda--but where the French limit their analysis to technical 
considerations concerning the law, completely internal to the law itself, Americans do 
not reject reference to value judgments and external considerations. 
Nevertheless, just as in the United States, the French tradition makes itself felt in 
the teaching of international law. Legal reasoning is much more systematic, logical, 
and synthetic, and is based on legal categories. It is done from textbooks (manue/s) 
and the study of cases or legal texts, but without other materials. It has to be rigorous 
and isolated from all ethical, moral, political, sociological, or economic considerations, 
in order to grasp what makes law unique. The teaching of international law is logically 
and tightly compartmentalized, and distinct from other disciplines; most of the time the 
division between the public and private spheres is strictly maintained and it remains 
much more deductive than in the United States. Certainly, the study of cases has 
66. See, e.g., Charles Leben, Une nouvelle controverse sur le positivisme en droit international, 5 
DROITS 121 (1987); Serge Sur, Quelques observations sur /es normes juridiques internationales, 4 
R.G.D.I.P. 901 (1985). For a critique of formalist French internal positivism, see Dupuy, supra note 16. 
67. See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INTERNATIONAL AW 1870-1960 at 440-45 (2002). 
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become widespread and education has become professionalized, but it no less remains 
true that its objective is above all to teach a set of rules and not to learn to elaborate 
arguments on the basis of particular cases. The cases serve primarily as examples to 
illustrate the rules and not as training in argumentative method. This does not 
necessarily mean that legal practitioners are less well-educated in France than in the 
United States-but not better either-for specialized and compartmentalized education 
in legal technique is perhaps more easily mastered and assimilated than the 
interdisciplinary and sophisticated education in the United States, even when it is 
presented in the context of concrete cases. Legal training of an exclusively technical 
sort suffers from the disadvantages of its disciplinary compartmentalization, but there 
are compensations made for the drawbacks of an overly dogmatic education. France 
has been able to find an equilibrium, often ignored by others, which has been described 
by Philippe Jestaz and Christophe Jamin as "a well tempered dogmatism," 68 where the 
rigor of the legal reasoning taught is as useful to practitioners as the American 
technique of argumentation and the "market place of ideas"69 that today seems to 
characterize the interdisciplinary currents in American law schools. 70 
F. The Opposition of the Two Internationalist Cultures 
In a similar vein, although the French conception is often considered to be rigid, 
unrealistic, and reductionist by Americans, American approaches may be perceived in 
France as ideological, moralistic, or quite simply confused, for they mix in political, 
economic, or social considerations, which could be considered foreign to law, thereby 
making decision-making or legal action uncertain. This accusation, seemingly one of 
a strictly epistemological nature, is rooted in a profound uneasiness felt by the French 
when confronted with any distortion of what for them is the law; confronted also with 
an American conception of international law, which tends more and more to tie legality 
to effectiveness. To consider as legal only those rules that are effectively and 
efficaciously applied is foreign to French legal culture, for the legal rule would become 
unstable, uncertain, and unpredictable if its existence were dependent on its end 
product and its effectiveness in practice. 71 According to the French conception, law 
erects safeguards which cannot always be respected. This is best expressed by one of 
our writers in a way that would undoubtedly make an American international lawyer 
shudder: "The destiny of law is to remain partially ineffective." 72 It is not that 
effectiveness is ignored in France by international legal culture. To the contrary, for 
several decades now it has been considered important, 73 but it is important in a way 
that necessarily remains limited as opposed to the requirements of American 
pragmatism and realism. It is true that the caricature and the stereotypes do not differ 
that much from my description of the American conception, because taken as a whole 
68. JESTAZ &JAMIN, supra note 27, at 303. 
69. Id. at 291. 
70. American law schools attract students by their intellectual effervescence but which at the same time 
distances the university world from the concrete world of professional practice. See STEPHEN CARTER, 
ECHEC ET MAT 244 (Robert Laffont ed., 2003). 
71. DENYS DE BECHILLON, QU'EST-CE QU'UNE REGLE DE DROrr? 62 (1997). 
72. Id. at 61. 
73. See Jouannet, supra note 64, at 27. 
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the pragmatic and realistic American conception aims less at abstractly connecting the 
validity and effectiveness of legal rules than at encouraging the study of the specific 
and effective consequences attributable to the rule in its political context. But excesses 
are possible. 
It is precisely this tendency toward the growing legal de-formalization of 
international law that the French fear in the American conception of international law, 
whether it be by means of the most classic American political realism, the culture of 
the marketplace, or the present-day expansion of a moralistic view oflaw. In the quest 
for effectiveness by the Americans, there is, for example, very often an economic 
approach to law, which strongly offends the French when it goes to the point of 
viewing law as a consumable good or when economic rationality is seen as the sole 
criterion for the evaluation of the efficiency of international institutions. 74 For the 
French, it is evident that legal logic differs from economic logic, even when both take 
into account, as they are doing more and more, cost-benefit analyses of legal 
institutions and norms. But very often also the perception that the French have of the 
American conception is exaggerated when they see, in the economic approach of the 
Americans, only the characteristic signs of American economic hucksterism and an 
extreme and unlimited neo-liberalism. They misjudge both the ethical significance of 
American utilitarianism and the cultural importance of political liberalism as integral 
parts of American culture in which certain rights are simply not negotiable. 75 
More generally, the realism and pragmatism of the Americans are discredited by 
the French for their absolutism and for their pernicious effects when they lead to a 
skeptical conception of law, where Americans can go so far as to deny the existence 
oflegal rules because they regard the formalist conception oflaw as totally unrealistic. 
I do not really believe that the French are any more oblivious than Americans to the 
weaknesses of existing international law and international institutions, but they do not 
draw the same conclusions. It is the implicit idealism underlying the American 
tradition which the French reject, the very absolutism ofits conception that can appear 
as a disappointed absolutism, as H.L.A. Hart has described, when confronted with the 
limits offormalism. 76 In the same vein, American moralism, which is today resurgent, 
is an integral part of American culture, but remains foreign to French legal culture, 
which is built on the fundamental distinction between law, religion, and morality. 
Americans are certainly equally committed to the separation of church and state, but 
they do not make as clear a separation between morality and law. 77 This does not mean 
to say that the French do not make moral judgments on the law or that they are unaware 
of the way in which the law embodies certain values, but they are firmly convinced of 
the fundamental soundness of the separation of law and morality. For example, 
74. For internal law see CADIET, supra note I 03, at I 06; Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics 
Movement, in 77 PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN REVIEW I (1987). On the history of this 
movement, which has generated a considerable amount ofliterature, see Ejan Mackaay, La reg le juridique 
observee par le prisme de / 'economisme-Une histoire sty/isee du mouvement d'analyse economique du 
droit, I 986 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT ECONOMIQUE 43 (1986). 
75. See RONALD DWORKIN, PRENDRE LES DROITS AUX SERIEUX (I 995). 
76. H.L.A. HART, LE CONCEPT DE DROIT I71-72 (M. Van de Kerchove, trans. 1976). For an incisive 
and stimulating critique of the American position obscured by the concept of effectiveness, see Jean-Marc 
Sorel, L 'ONE et /'/RAK: le vii plomb ne s'est pas transforme en or, 108 R.G.D.I.P. 845 (2004). 
77. See generally, DIANA L. ECH, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA (2002). 
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existing violations of international law ought not, according to the French, to be 
justified by moral (or religious) standards to which one wants to accord legal effects 
not formally recognized by the community of states. 
For such a moralization of law would unilateralize applicable regimes for the 
benefit of the one who has the just cause (moral cause), allowing free rein to excesses 
which the law is no longer able to control. 78 The example of the treatment at 
Guantanamo is, from this point of view, particularly shocking for the French. 
In reality, the subject is very delicate to consider in terms of culture, because the 
great majority of American international lawyers has raised objections to the 
Guantanamo situation in such a way as to produce a veritable internal split between the 
government's position and that of the professional academic world;79 and it would be 
totally false to argue that, from a cultural perspective, all Americans support arbitrary 
methods of detention (or even torture). Nothing is more contrary to the American 
legal tradition of guaranteeing fundamental procedural and substantive rights. There 
is, however, an acceptance by a segment of the population of what is claimed by the 
government as necessary for security. This said, it appears to me also true that the 
legal moralism that accompanies the justifications advanced by the present American 
government represent an important aspect of American legal culture; and that this 
moralization of law is shared this time by many professional liberal international 
lawyers, even though they criticize the errors of Guantanamo. 
At this point we can clearly see an opposition with French formalist legal culture, 
for the European history of wars of religion, fanaticism, and just wars is deeply rooted 
in the cultural, historic, and legal heritage of the French and allows us to explain in part 
the French conception of international law, which strives for neutrality, formality, 
objectivity, and a foundation of the separation oflaw and morals. The scientistic and 
methodological positivism of French professional culture of the 20th century was 
certainly critical in the formation of this contemporary conception of law. It would 
evidently be too long an undertaking to retrace here its extremely long and complex 
development, but at least we can take a look at its contemporary repercussions when 
confronted by the more moralistic discourse of Americans on international law. 
Culturally, the French now consider that institutionalized judicial procedures alone are 
able to guarantee the protection of all, while the invocation of the moral principles 
underlying the formally-existing rules leads to interventions and the radicalization of 
conflicts by polarizing governments, and also by obliging third parties to intervene. 
Finally, true to their legal tradition, the French also defend respect for legal formalism 
and legalism against the moralization of law in order to avoid arbitrariness and above 
all, the temptation to open that well-known Pandora's Box. 
In any case, Americans may rightly call attention to the scientistic illusion in this 
claim to objectivity and the lack of responsiveness of existing international law to 
78. See OLIVER CORTEN, LE RETOUR DES GUERRES PREVENTIVES: LEDROIT INTERNATIONAL MENACE 
82 (2003); TZVET AN TODOROV, LE NOUVEAU DESORDRE MONDIAL: REFLEXIONS D'UN EURO PEEN 3 7 (2005). 
79. E.g., Interview by Mark Colvin with Richard Falk (Aug. 3,2005), available at http://www.abc.net 
. au/ c gi-b in/ c omon/printfriendly. http://www.abc.net.a u/pm/content/200 5/s 14 2 9 54 8. htmc gi-
bin/comon/printfriendly. Criticism has also come from the judiciary. See, e.g., Charles Lane, The High 
Court Looks Abroad, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2005, at A5 (statement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor at 
West Point, Oct. 20, 2005). 
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contemporary terrorism; and remind the French of their own past as a colonial state 
fighting for its own security or to impose its own domination. Guantanamo may also 
force the French to confront a more recent past than that of the old just wars of the 17th 
and 18th centuries. In the history of French colonialism of the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, it was the very legal formalism of the French that accompanied and 
legitimized profoundly unjust, arbitrary, unequal situations, for the benefit of the most 
powerful colonial state. The force of international law was thus here in the service of 
the policy of expansion of the European states and did not play its part as a barrier to 
the excesses of the powerful. Moreover, the elaboration of the legal system of 
discrimination in the colonies, by a positivist doctrine that saw itself as neutral and 
objective reinforced the legitimization and the ordinariness of the process.so In other 
words, abuses such as Guantanamo can be as easily linked to the American anti-
formalist tradition as to the French formalist tradition, and it will be for each country 
to understand what in its legal tradition can be manipulated or utilized to nationalist, 
imperialist, or colonial ends. There is thus a blot on French legal culture just as there 
is on American legal culture that neither can ignore by simply denouncing the other; 
and it would be appropriate for each to understand what in its legal tradition can be 
manipulated or utilized for nationalist, imperialist, or colonial ends. 
Without accepting the excess of Guantanamo, however, which they have forcefully 
denounced, even liberal American international lawyers and those who view 
international law from a critical perspective, point out the inadaptability of existing 
international law to contemporary terrorism, relying on their pragmatic and realist 
culture of"effectivity," and also call attention to the scientistic illusion of the French 
objectivist claim that law and morals should be strictly separated. In so doing, some 
Americans, asserting their neutrality and objectivity, make no bones about reminding 
France of its own past, by confronting it with Vichy or its history as a colonial state 
striving to protect its security or to impose its domination.s 1 
Finally, the way in which French and Americans establish the existence of a rule 
of customary international law is also revealing of their cultural differences. These 
differences are hidden behind contemporary debates concerning the use of force, 
humanitarian intervention, and "legitimate preventive self-defense."s 2 Americans 
prioritize practice itself in a very flexible manner. Similarly, Americans prioritize all 
types of actions and behaviors, if they are those of"major states," because their realist 
and policy-oriented perspective leads them to consider such actions and behaviors as 
decisive. In so doing, they once again want to go beyond legal formalism by insisting 
on the primacy of a customary law that is more adapted to specific circumstances and 
also more directly based on moral and political values than on an overly rigid agreed-
80. This is especially true of positivist doctrine of the mid-20th century, because formerly it was as 
much natural law-based and was linked to the movement of moralization ofintemational law (with the same 
effects). On the question of the neutrality of positivism in France, especially with respect to Vichy, see the 
debate between Daniele Lochak and Michel Troper, in THEORRIE DU DROIT ET SCIENCE, VARI! AUCTORES 
293-309, 310-24 (P. Amselek ed., 1994). 
81. N. Berman, Les ambivalences imperiales, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN EUROPE ET EN 
AMERJQUE (H. Ruiz-Fabri & Emmanuelle Jouanet eds., 2006) (forthcoming). 
82. See generally Oliver Corten, The Controversies Over the Customary Prohibition on the Use of 
Force: A Methodological Debate, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 803 (2006). 
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upon text. Conversely, the French ( and Europeans) have the tendency to prioritize the 
existence of opinio juris, and more formal criteria for the determination of custom, but 
of course not neglecting practice and the material aspect of custom. 83 They engage in 
a more restrictive interpretation of the material aspect of customary law so as not to 
systematically devalue the formal text as such.84 · 
Similarly, the French regard the formal international rule as the preeminent final 
product and essential to resolving, constraining, or limiting violence within the context 
of international law itself. Conversely, for Americans, formal law is seen as only one 
means among others to attain peace and stability. And by a very continental-type 
conflation of formal law and law in and of itself, the French see their conception 
embodying the defense of international law itself, and the security, predictability, and 
elimination of violence that it represents. This expresses an unquestionable confidence 
in the virtues of international law, which is not really shared by Americans, whatever 
their political persuasion. Let us avoid caricatures, however, even in a simplified· 
description of cultural approaches, which might tempt us to say that Americans delight 
in defending a skeptical or cynical conception of international law. In the United 
States, where the idea that "no one is above the law" is historically and culturally much 
stronger than in F ranee, 85 it is evident that Americans believe in the virtues oflaw. But 
it is also true that this belief seems to be directed much more toward domestic society 
than toward international society. The French frequently entertain the idea that 
Americans take a very Hobbesian view of international society and that they contrast 
the well-ordered domestic society with total "international disorder." This is a 
perception that presumably can support any particular American policy, academic 
orientation, or governmental declaration. It is also an idea that is advanced by the 
discipline of international relations, but seems to be present to a lesser degree today in 
the legal culture of American international lawyers. It seems that the contemporary 
evolution of international law, its growing technical complexity, its continuous 
development in a variety of areas, its becoming more commonplace in some respect, 
and the globalization of society and oflaw86 are many of the factors that have led to the 
modification of many classical conceptions. In effect, most American international 
lawyers-and surely most Americans-now perceive international law as a more 
mature and complex system than they thought and which, from this point of view, is 
not too far removed from continental conceptions. However, this in no way prevents 
Americans from adopting a more skeptical view with respect to the efficacy and 
legitimacy of the international legal system because of their own culture and their 
conception of law, which is much less transferable to the international level. Is it 
83. Beyond the particular division considered here, Professor Carten has elaborated in detail a 
distinction between "extensive" and "restrictive" analysis. Id. passim. 
84. Id. On the American position, which seems to be widely shared, see Sofaer supra note 39, at 212-
13. See generally Richard N. Gardner, Neither Bush nor the "Jurisprudes, "97 AM. J. INT'LL. 585 (2003); 
William H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 
(2003). 
85. ELISABETH ZOLLER, DE NIXON A CLINTON: MALENTENDUS JURJOIQUES TRANSATLANTIQUES 95 
(1999). 
86. J.J. ROCHE, THEORIE DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES 132 (2d ed. 1997). For a more classic 
American presentation, see Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values, and Functions, 216 
R.C.A.D.I. 45 (1989). 
HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 315 2006
2006] LEGAL CULTURES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 315 
because the excesses of judicial authority within the United States push Americans to 
avoid replicating the same mistakes at the international level, as has been suggested?B7 
It seems more probable to think the opposite, that is, here too we are seeing the more 
general effects ofNorth American legal culture where law must be applied in practice 
by means of effective and equitable procedures. This is true also for international law, 
although we are dealing with an international society still largely lacking in the means 
of enforcement and in a sufficient number of impartial tribunals. Even if Americans 
do not challenge the existence of an international society under law, even if some go 
so far as to develop again and in a much more positive fashion, the vision of a 
cosmopolitan international society, a true international community, Americans cannot 
put an end to a culture of distrust, which was already present during the brightest hours 
of Wilsonian idealism.BB 
The comparative pessimism which endures about international society encourages 
the development of an American national vision that, even in its liberal form, leads to 
supporting international action in favor of the international community only to the 
extent that it advances the most immediate interests of the United States.B9 This is a 
realistic policy that any state, including France, would certainly adopt, and that the 
French would accept as politics as usual, 90 but which in the United States seems to have 
been transformed into an integral aspect of American legal culture. One sees its direct 
effects in regard to the Kyoto Protocol, the non-ratification of the Convention on the 
Elimination of Chemical Weapons, the rejection of the Treaty on Anti-Personnel 
Mines, the commercial activity of the pharmaceutical industry, and the existence of the 
International Criminal Court. As Andre Kaspi testily remarks, American opinion 
"makes foreign policy an outgrowth of internal policy''; 91 a view which Robert Kagan 
supports by commenting that ''the internationalism [ of Americans] has always been a 
product derived from their nationalism." 92 This attitude, which has been the subject 
of much comment, certainly fuels the lack of understanding and the sharp criticism on 
the part of the French as well as other Europeans. It would be particularly offensive 
to think that this attitude betrays a tolerance on the part of Americans of anti-personnel 
mines, dictators, or pollution, for example, because such an attitude is most of the time 
linked to their world-wide involvements that expose them more than other countries 
87. See generally, Pildes, supra note 35. 
88. See generally the analyses of ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, ANEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Benjamin 
B. Ferencz, A Brief Summary of New Legal Foundations for Global Survival, http://www.benferencz.org/ 
legal.htrn; THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (I 995); Fernando 
R. Teson, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1992). 
89. See JUSTIN ROSENBERG, THE EMPIRE OF CIVIL SOCIETY: A CRITIQUE OF THE REALIST HEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1994). 
90. See GUY LACHARRIERE, LA POLmQUE JURIDIQUE XTERIEURE DES ETA TS ( 1983). 
91. KAsPI, supra note 15, at 218. 
92. ROBERT KAGAN, LA PUISSANCE T LA FAIBLESSE 138 (Hachette Litterature ed. 2004). 
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to many complex and delicate situations that need to be managed.93 At the same time, 
however, this attitude does express what seems to have become a true nationalist 
culture: the subordination of international law to American interests and an enduring 
and profound distrust of international law itself. It is when pressure to ignore foreign 
jurisprudence and even treaties that bind the United States is applied to the Supreme 
Court of the United States and the courts of the states that this attitude is most 
insidiously and disturbingly expressed to foreigners (including the French).94 
This conception of international law and international society is contrary to the 
more cosmopolitan French and European Kantian tradition. 95 The French are generally 
perceived by Americans as always coming down-in a more Kantian way, so to 
speak-on the side of a world pacified by the peaceful settlement of disputes, the 
institutionalization of inter-state society, and the expansion of international law itself. 
This image, however, must be put in a comparative perspective to be properly 
understood, as it is often presented in a false and reductionist manner.96 Of course 
there is certainly in France, as in Europe, an underlying cultural foundation for the 
Kantian cosmopolitan ideal. But, just as Kant did not envision the cosmopolitan world 
as completely institutionalized, the French too rejected the French jurist Georges 
Scelle's idea ofa world state-a fashionable view during the inter-war period. French 
legal culture has always adapted very well to the political interplay of international 
relations. The classical vision of an inter-state society that it has so long embraced 
could only reinforce this realist tendency, so that, contrary to what Americans might 
think, there is in effect very little idealism (at least claimed as such) in present-day 
French internationalist culture. Even the objectivist monism of Georges Scelle, so 
emblematic abroad of the French idealist conception oflaw (progressive and leftist in 
its political orientation) was presented as being much more realistic than all other 
representations oflaw because it was grounded in a denunciation of the abuses oflegal 
fictions in international law. However, for the French as a whole, the respect for a 
certain legal formalism, in order to avoid dilution of the legal rule from political 
influences, remains the line not to be crossed. It is this realist (and not idealist) 
conception of international law that does not correspond with the American realist 
conception of international law and with American skepticism regarding rules. One 
might say, however, that the dominant French model remains positivist formalism with 
a minor realist component. Thus one can see very well the link between the French 
tradition oflegal positivism (whether sociological, voluntarist, or systemic) and the 
desire for a clear legalization of power relations, because the perspective is always that 
of establishing a world of law that could not be confused with one governed by 
93. See LAURENT COHEN-TANUGI, LES SENTINELLES DE LALIBERTE: L'EUROPE ET L' AMERIQUE AU 
SEUL DU XXIe SIECLE 201 (Odite Jacob ed. 2003). For a comprehensive assessment of the attitude of the 
United States toward the implementation of treaties, see Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its 
Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 313 (200 I). For a critique of current discourse of the 
American government, see Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False 
Prophets, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 9 (2000). 
94. See Pearlstein, supra note 11 ( discussing the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations). 
95. JURGEN HABERMAS, UNE EPOQUE DE TRANSITIONS. ECRITS POLITIQUES 1998-2003 at 394 (Fayard 
ed. 2005). 
96. Especially by Robert Kagan, with respect to Europe and the United States. See KAGAN, supra note 
92, at 138. 
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moralism or politics alone--a world that should substitute institutionalized legal 
procedures for deciding questions of intent (e.g., enemy non-combatants) or judging 
the unilateral actions of national power politics (e.g., the second intervention in Iraq). 
As a result, culturally, the French have the tendency to respond to international 
problems by recommending the adoption of new norms (the more law there is, the 
more stability will rule )97 or new international institutions, like in the areas of economic 
relations, the environment, or criminal justice. On the other hand, Americans will seek 
active approaches, implementation, and oversight, which will not necessarily be legal 
(without necessarily being contrary to law) or institutional in nature; 98 and will be 
critical of the over estimation of a law that is never enforced or the existence of a 
paralyzing bureaucracy divorced from reality. The image that each has ofinternational 
institutions (and of their officials) has become quasi-symbolic and reflects this 
profound disagreement. Given their broad conception ofinternational law, both public 
and private, Americans will see law symbolized in international commercial law and 
private international law, in the law pertaining to international trade, including the 
World Trade Organization, rather than in the great resolutions of the United Nations. 
For Americans, the law is just as much at the disposition of private actors and 
organizations as it is an instrument of state power. On the other hand, the United 
Nations remains the symbol of international law for the French, and without doubt, in 
some respects, for Americans as well.99 The French, however, still see the United 
Nations as the site of possible progress and envision the international official as being 
a priori in the service of the common good, 100 while Americans more and more have 
the tendency to see the United Nations as the symbol of the paralysis of international 
law-thus again making the link with their culture of distrust of all bloated, over-
hierarchic bureaucracies. Samuel Huntington even characterizes the rejection of this 
type of bureaucracy as an American paradigm. 101 According to the French, however, 
this is a misguided American obsession. In reality, it seems to me that the French come 
to the same conclusion as the Americans regarding a certain loss of credibility and 
effectiveness of the United Nations, but they do not assign to it the same causes. The 
French are more optimistic about the organization itself, certainly because of their legal 
culture, but also because it is not the United Nations or institutions in general that they 
hold responsible for the deadlocks in the system, but more the lack of will on the part 
of states. 102 
97. According to Jean Combacau, there is a majoritarian "Scellian" tendency in French doctrine, Jean 
Combacau, Les reactions de la doctrine a la creation du droit par le juge en droit international public, 
inLAIIBACTIONDELADOCTRJNEALACIIBATIONDUDROITPARLESJUGES,31 TRAVAUXDEL'AsSOCIATION 
HENRI CAPITANT402 (1980). 
98. Sigfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 316 
(1999). 
99. See KAGAN, supra note 92, at 63 (recalling the commitment of Americans to multilateral action in 
the context of the United Nations. Moreover, the author suggests that the Americans claim to have created 
the United Nations. Despite this, Americans have a much more negative image of this institution than the 
French.). 
I 00. On public administration in France, see YVES MENY, LA CORRUPTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE ( 1992). 
IOI. Samuel Huntington, Paradigms of American Politics, 89 POL. SCI. Q. 20 (1974). 
I 02. See Jean Combacau & Paul Reuter, Ce n 'est pas /afaute de/ 'ONU si /es Nations Unies le sont si 
peu, in INSTITUTIONS ET RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES 355 (2d ed. 1982). 
HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 318 2006
318 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:2 
Furthermore, parallel to the way in which they envision the possibilities oflaw, it 
is also the relationship to war that is envisaged in a profoundly different manner within 
the legal cultures of international lawyers in France and the United States. More than 
80% of Americans think that war can lead to the establishment of justice in 
international law, while only 50% of Europeans (including the French) are of that 
persuasion. 103 Moreover, when American and European (including French) views of 
human rights are contrasted, the common opinion is that Europeans (including the 
French) do not seek to impose their conception abroad, but only to promote its 
development in their own countries, while Americans today are ready to impose their 
view by military force. 104 There is therefore a relationship to war and the use of force 
which is more easily accepted, from a cultural perspective, in one country than in the 
other. Everyone is in agreement in thinking that these attitudes can be explained in 
part with reference to the history of past wars and suffering which have been 
experienced differently by Europeans and Americans. But is there not also in the 
reforming perspective of American pragmatism, and in the American tradition, a 
"heroic," progressive, and active dimension, which is different from the more neutral, 
conservative, and pacifists perspective ofFrench positivism? 105 Even though this is so, 
it would be incorrect for that reason to characterize the French as effete pacifists and 
the Americans as unbridled warmongers. The French have several times resorted to 
force, for example the first Iraq war and in the conflicts in Kosovo and Afghanistan. 
I do not believe for an instant that Americans have a particular love for war, although 
the concept of security advanced during the past few years has supplanted that of peace 
in the American imagination. 106 The more moderate attitudes of each country are 
distorted, however, by mutual prejudices and by the occurrence of certain excesses that 
are inherent in the relations of the strong to the weak. Each of the two camps takes 
advantage of these excesses to stigmatize the perverse effects of each others' positions 
as reflecting-to use the well-known terms ofMartti Koskenniemi-either the utopian 
idealism of the weak (meaning the multilateral legalism of the French) or the imperia-
list apology of the strong (meaning the unilateralist realism of the Americans). 107 
G. American Realist Legalism and French Formalist Legalism 
What can we deduce from these observations? Without doubt, behind the clear-
cut opposition between pragmatism and formalism, from a more nuanced perspective, 
one can see the opposition between different conceptions of legality which derive in 
103. Poll taken in 2003. See ROBERT KAGAN, LE REVERS DE IA PUISSANCE. LES ETATS-UNIS EN QUETE 
DE LEGITIMITE 9 (2003). 
I 04. See Pierre Rosanvallon, Europe-Etats-Unis, /es deux universalismes, LE MONDE, Feb. 22, 2005; 
Martti Koskenniemi, Perceptions of Justice: Walls and Bridges Between Europe and the United States, 
64 ZA6RV 305 (2004) (the two writers expressing different variants of this idea). 
I 05. On the heroic character of instrumentalism, see Koskenniemi, supra note 34. 
106. See, e.g., KALEVIJ. HOLST!, THE STATE, WAR, AND THE STATE OF WAR (1996). 
I 07. MARTT! KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APoLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ARGUMENT (1989) ( demonstrating how the realist and idealist argument developed by internationalists 
tends always to oscillate between apology (in the service of Realpolitik) and utopianism (in the service of 
the formal rule oflaw), and that these two types of accusations are very often those that the Americans and 
the French regularly level at each other). 
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part from the different legal cultures of the two countries. The formalist legality of the 
French is easy to see because it is not presently under serious challenge and remains 
relatively coherent in the perception that it has of itself. On the other hand, the 
American conception of legality is sometimes impossible to pin down today as it is 
shrouded by government policy which seems to be adopting rather atypical legal ideas 
and policies, when viewed in the light of the American tradition. This American 
conception oflegality has its roots in this tradition, but it is an unusual combination of 
the interventionist idealism of Wilson and the isolationist moralism of the republican 
tradition. 108 However, one would be mistaken to reduce the American conception of 
international law to that of the Bush administration. The American tradition is not that 
of a non-legalistic realism, but rather that of a realist legalism, to employ here the 
felicitous formulation of Helene Ruiz-Fabri, 109 who contrasts it with the formalist 
legalism of the French. That is to say that aside from the most extreme realists, 
Americans have, no more than the French, renounced the rule of law in transnational 
or international relations, but rather entertain a broader conception of what law is and 
a realist culture of suspicion when confronted with its ineffectiveness or its unjust 
character. This makes the American conception less worrisome and at the same time 
much more interesting. As Elisabeth Zoller has so rightly pointed out, American legal 
culture is characterized by "its respect for justice and for law," 110 and one cannot 
understand the American conception of law if one does not keep that in mind, even if 
it is a question of international law. 
For all that, there is still more to say regarding this opposition between different 
representations of international law, for we are today witnessing a common awakening 
of interest in questions of justice and shared values in international law, which is 
confusing the pragmatist/formalist division and is complicating each conception, 
bringing about the reassertion of other values in the two cultures. The view shared by 
both countries that international law is approaching a real maturity and complexity also 
changes the nature of the questions asked. Thus, today, an American international 
lawyer will not only be confronted with the question of whether international law is 
definite, applicable, and effective, but also in specific cases, whether it is just. The 
answer to this question can involve contradictory logics, because the effective law will 
not necessarily be the most just and the just law can sometimes be made effective only 
with great difficulty. But at least the inclination is there. That is what the words of 
Thomas Franck express, seeing in this situation the posing of new questions for 
international law: 
The questions to which the international lawyer must now be prepared to respond, in 
this post-ontological era, are different from the traditional inquiry: whether 
international law is law? Instead, we are now asked: Is international law effective? Is 
108. ROCHE, supra note 86, at 19. For a thorough development of this point, see Alex Lorite 
Escorihuela, Cultural Relativism the American Way: The Nationalist School of International Law in the 
United States, 5 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS (2005), available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/ 
vol5/iss I /art2/. 
109. Ruiz-Fabri, supra note 10, at 181 (calling attention to the ambiguities of"realistic legalism"). 
110. ZOLLER, supra note 85, at 3. 
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it enforceable? Is it understood? And the most important question: Is international law 
fair?111 
As a general matter, Americans and the French seem to agree on the view expressed 
by Thomas Franck that existing international law integrates into the various matters 
with which it is concerned the value of fairness. This is so because of our 
contemporary reorientation towards justice and values. But for all that, Americans and 
the French do not think in the same way about questions of the justness of law, or, 
more generally, about legitimacy in international law. 112 
H Culture of Justice and Culture of Law 
I would like to return to the question of the moralization oflaw by the Americans 
that I have already considered. First, for Americans, it seems that the question of''the 
justness of law" answers itself. In contrast, the French are very concerned with 
disassociating morals from law, and with the concept that legitimacy comes from 
lawfulness. That does not prevent American writers like Thomas Franck from 
undertaking critical analyses of discourse on this subject, but without challenging the 
fact that the question of the ''justness oflaw" has become central. Moreover, ifwe 
enlarge this idea somewhat with respect to domestic American culture more generally, 
going beyond professional legal culture, it seems that Americans always spontaneously 
make an implicit distinction between "good" law and "bad" law according to inherent 
conceptions of justice and goodness. 113 We find here the idea, still too often a 
caricature, according to which all Americans think that the American conception oflaw 
is necessarily "good" or ''just" because it is the product of a good and moral people. 
It is true that this is a notion repeated frequently by several American presidents, but, 
as Carol Greenhouse perceptively notes, culturally, Americans see themselves as 
"agents oflaw rather than as obeying it," because law is perceived as "an extension of 
their own good sense and character." 114 While this may be close to the truth, it can 
only promote the idea ofbeing able to refashion law as they choose, which accentuates 
law's utilitarian aspect. Where Americans display an absolute certainty in favor of 
new, more just principles, others only see contempt for the existing formal law and 
arrogance. But is not a certain arrogance the best shared characteristic between 
Americans and the French when the latter are also convinced of the universal validity 
of their own conception and understanding oflaw? Whatever it is, the American way 
of envisioning the justness oflaw is counterbalanced by their utilitarian culture, which 
tempers the idea that justice is uniquely based on moral values. 115 Efficacy remains a 
fundamental condition of legitimacy for Americans. Because utilitarianism and 
moralism remain quite remote from French legal culture, the French may share this 
111. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 6 (1995). 
112. I am not directing my remarks specifically at Professor Franck's analysis, which is subtle and 
dissects the idea of fairness in tenns of"legitimacy" and "distributive justice," which can have the same 
meaning, but which can also have contradictory meanings, especially at the international level. Id. at 7-80. 
113. See Eric A. Posner, Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1901 (2003). 
114. Greenhouse, supra note 13, at 50. See also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW(l990). 
I 15. FRANCK,supra note 121, at 8-40. 
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dual concern but without responding to it in the same way. For the French, the ')ust" 
international law is at best the formal law that exists. Although moral justice exists, and 
although the legitimacy of certain institutions is doubtful or they are ineffective, it 
ought never to lead to a violation of the law, but rather, to its reformation by means of 
existing procedures or through the use of exceptions to or derogations from the rules 
already provided for by the law. 
Given these considerations, law and justice, the two terms used by Professor 
Zoller, are all the more interesting. I intend to consider them separately in order to 
characterize the American and French conceptions of international law today. It is in 
effect more justice, it seems to me, than law itself, which characterizes American 
culture in comparison with French culture, apart, of course, from the pragmatism/ 
formalism division. 1I6 The American culture of justice broadly conceived does not 
only comprise judicial culture, and the respect for judicial power, but more signifi-
cantly a deep need for just law, which necessarily requires a just decision by a judge 
following equitable procedures. 117 Theories of justice, now inescapable elements of 
domestic American culture, seem therefore to have indirect impacts on the American 
conception of international law. Such a conception is, it seems, taken to its extreme 
by most Americans today by conflating it with their deeper moral or religious 
standards, including their conviction ofhaving a mission to carry out for the rest of the 
world. 118 It holds out the prospect of going beyond formal international legality in 
order to effectuate legal principles considered to be just and already commonly 
accepted-like democracy or human rights-or in order to be able to intervene in 
desperate and exceptional humanitarian situations. This notion once again points out 
the contrasts between legal culture broadly conceived by the French, where, despite its 
tendency to paralyze and deadlock, the system legally accepted must be respected-
which accentuates the rigid side of formalism. In other words, positions adopted in 
response to these developments amplify the dominant aspect of each culture. One 
might also resort to caricature to which the present governments are certainly open-as 
is public opinion on each side of the Atlantic frequently-by drawing the contrast 
between the American upholder of justice Gustice, if necessary by war) 119 and the 
French legalist (peace through law). This would evidently be still too reductionist, 
because the American conception of justice normally includes respect for procedural 
law, while the French conception oflaw also claims to embody a form of justice. It is 
the transposition to the international level of political considerations, as well as present 
circumstances, which leads to pushing each model to its extreme. 
116. Americans seem to me to be much more imbued with contemporary theories of justice than the 
French. See G. Calves, France-Etats-Unis: deux cu/turesjuridiques, 228 Le droit dans la societe, Cahiers 
fram;:ais, Oct.-Dec. 1998, at 29; J.P. Chazal, Philosophie et theorie du droit ou /'illusion scientifique, 
L'AMERICANISATION DU DROIT 212 (2001). 
117. This is so even if one knows the importance of the law in the United States in contrast with Great 
Britain. See M.D. Trapet, L 'hypothese de/ 'americanisation de /'institution judiciaire, L' AMERICANISA-
TION DU DROIT 121 (2001). 
118. The ideas of the "grand design" and the "indispensable nation" were expressed by almost all 
American presidents. See KAsPI, supra note 15, at 212. 
119. See Michael J. Glennon, The New Interventionism: the Search for a Just International Law, 78 
FOREIGN AFF. 2 (1999). 
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However, the re-emergence of values in international law by means of human 
rights and the idea of international justice confront each of the two countries with its 
own ambivalence concerning its own legal culture. We cannot fail to recognize that 
the American position sometimes forces the French to directly confront their own 
contradictions. 120 One will recall especially the profoundly ambivalent attitude of 
France-and Europe-at the time of the intervention in Kosovo, since it was presented 
as legitimate, although not legal, on the basis of arguments identical to those of 
American liberal international lawyers.121 Existing formal procedures were set aside 
in the name of moral principles and the acceptance of an intervention considered 
legitimate and just, although it was not legal. More generally, the example of Kosovo 
demonstrates how difficult it is to maintain a strictly legalistic and formalistic attitude 
with respect to the new ethical dimension of international law as long as there is a lack 
of effective international institutions. But while Americans deliberately rush into the 
breach, as in Iraq, for example, the French are much more skeptical because of their 
own legal culture and resist such action most of the time. There results from this, it 
seems to me, a perception still more complex of the American view of international 
law, because Americans are tom between their own domestic legal culture and the 
possibility of its adaptation at the international level,just as they are tom between their 
internationalism and their nationalism. 122 The attitude of Americans toward inter-
national criminal tribunals is revealing of this schizophrenia; and America is equally 
ambivalent with respect to questions oflegality and legitimacy. With their support of 
the two international criminal tribunals for the former-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, we see 
Americans' desire for the judicial justice to which they are so fervently attached, but 
at the same time they rejected the International Criminal Court, which might involve 
them. And, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations has remarked, might one 
not think that "[t]hose who seek to bestow legitimacy must themselves embody it; and 
those who invoke international law must themselves submit to it?" 123 
The considerations discussed above are intended to demonstrate how the 
fundamental values of the two societies have both positive and negative repercussions 
on each country's manner of conceiving international law. Economic rationality, the 
quest for effectiveness, the importance of morality and religion, and judicial justice are 
the values of the American world, which have impacts on its conception of 
international law. The importance and the ideal character of law that is general and 
equal for all, the principle of legality, the separation of morality and law, the 
importance of formalism, a distant relationship between law and economics, are the 
values of the French world, which have the same type of impacts. However, as the 
120. P.M. Eisemann, Preface, in L'INTERVENTION ARMEE DE L'OTAN EN REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE DE 
YOUGOSLAVIE, PERSPECTIVES INTERNATIONALES (2001) For a more general treatment, providing more 
examples, see Dupuy, supra note 16, at 207. 
121. 8ARABRA DELCOURT, DROIT ET SOUVERAINETES: ANALYSE CRITIQUE DU DISCO URS EUROPEEN SUR 
LA YOUGOSLAVIE (2003). See also Dominique de Villepin, Law, Force and Justice: Speech to the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (Mar. 27, 2003). On the American liberal position, see Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Op-Ed., Good Reasons for Going Around the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at A33. 
122. A schizophrenic position maintained without concern by means of a double standard-there is one 
rule that one applies to oneself and another that one applies to others. KAGAN, supra note 92, at 135. 
123. Kofi Anan, Secretary-General, United Nations, address to the General Assembly (Sept. 21, 2004), 
available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/s9/statements/sg-english.pdf. 
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ambivalence that cuts across the Franco-American divide clearly demonstrates-ifin 
fact there was any need to do so at all-French and American cultural perspectives on 
international law can only be viewed with difficulty from a static point of view. It is 
also necessary to examine them from a dynamic perspective. 
II. DYNAMIC DESCRIPTION OF THE FRANCO-AMERICAN DIVIDE AND THE 
"REFLECTIVE APPROPRIATION" OF LEGAL CULTURES 
The recourse to a more dynamic description ofFrench and American legal cultures 
is not intended to overshadow the significance of the static division, which continues 
to produce important effects in practice, 124 but it allows us to develop a more nuanced 
view of differing French and American perspectives on international law. Beyond the 
principal legal traditions in each country, there are in fact a multiplicity of divisions 
within each, which illustrates both the complexity of each culture and its continuing 
dynamism. In my view, however, the two approaches (static and dynamic) are 
complementary and not antagonistic. They in fact coexist, and it seems to me that only 
by means of a "reflective appropriation" of these cultural visions, viewed from both 
static and dynamic perspectives, can we surmount the sterile disagreements and mutual 
misunderstandings which they engender. 
A. Advantages and Limits of a Binary and Static Presentation 
A schematic description ofFrench and American legal perspectives, with carefully 
chosen examples, cannot fully explain their significance or claim to reveal their 
objective truth, but simply try to describe their most commonly shared representations. 
It seems to me that such a description is helpful for a general clarification of the 
principal orientations of each of the two conceptions and to determine which of their 
components are unalterable when it is a question of creating, utilizing, interpreting, or 
applying international law. By virtue of the conceptual categories that they produce 
(legal categories and concepts), cultural and national perspectives on international law 
are also factors in the creation of the norms of international law, and are an element in 
the reality that they seek to describe but in which they also necessarily participate. 
Without being direct sources oflaw, however, the role of national perspectives is not 
neutral. Questions concerning the interpretation of international norms, their integra-
tion into domestic legal systems, and their application by domestic tribunals can only 
raise the stakes because international legal actors cannot abstract themselves from their 
entire legal and cultural backgrounds. 
Even supposing, however, that my own subjectivity and personal reconstruction 
have not totally distorted it, the classic, static presentation of the Franco-American 
division has its limitations. There is always a risk in presenting a binary description. 
In seeking to describe without nuances the most general perspectives, agreed upon by 
doctrine and practice, a binary description is necessarily reductive, because it describes 
a strictly-confined argumentative confrontation between two parties (here Americans 
124. See Alejandro M. Garo, On Some Practical Implications of the Diversity of Legal Cultures for 
Lawyering in the Americas, 64 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 461 (1995); Mark W. Janis et al., Panel Session, 
Comparative Approaches to the Theory of International Law, 80 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 52 (1986). 
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and the French) without calling into question that confrontation itself. The result of 
this is a conservative orientation to the reasoning and the positions adopted, which 
contributes to making it resistant to dialogue and communication-so that one might 
convey the impression of digging even deeper the ditch that one would like to fill in. 125 
At the same time, this division certainly exists; we all know it, whatever the content 
that each gives to it, even if it means criticizing my presentation of it. The division is 
often obscured by other considerations, but it nevertheless dictates some of our 
behaviors without our really being aware of it. So it is certainly necessary to take it 
into account. From this point of view, we have to understand that Americans and the 
French lock themselves into certain ways of looking at things because of their 
educational systems and their ways of communicating about law. As G. Sacerdotti has 
so rightly remarked, 126 it is alarming to see the degree to which writers and 
practitioners refer only to legal materials in their own language. He cites, for example, 
the American Journal of International Law, where articles making reference to 
American sources alone greatly predominate. 127 Ifwe look at the two leading French 
international law journals, theAnnuairefran~ais de droit international and the Revue 
generale de droit international public, we would see largely the same thing (with the 
exception of more frequent citations to European sources). Doctrine has the tendency 
to reproduce itself within the same body ofreferences on each side of the Atlantic and 
thus continue to perpetuate among the practitioners who read it the same patterns of 
thought. This is undoubtedly the most intractable problem. Although they are equally 
captives of their own legal cultures and of a similar collective confinement, academics 
often have personal perspectives on international law that are more sophisticated, more 
discriminating, and more nuanced than those I have described, but they purvey a 
reductive and simplified knowledge to practitioners at large who then engage in their 
practice with these presuppositions. In so doing, one can go even further to say that 
all this occurs as if this division, incorporated by the effect oflegal reasoning into the 
legal culture of each country, had vanished from the immediate consciousness of most 
professionals, becoming in this way even more powerful because it is no longer 
conscious. It begins then ''to resemble an objective fact [that] one postulates" and by 
which one is conditioned. 128 
B. Dynamic Description of Legal Cultures 
It is therefore desirable to return to the idea of legal culture. In so doing, I want 
to suggest the development of a more flexible conception of the notion oflegal culture, 
one which is certainly truer to the complex reality of our societies and which has been 
developed by certain contemporary writers. I have been inspired in these reflections 
by the work of Eric Hobsbawm, Jurgen Habermas, Jean-Marc Ferry, Yasuki Onuma, 
H. Patrick Glenn, and Edgar Morin 129 on tradition, memory, and history, and I have 
125. COHEN-TANUGI, supra note 93, at 201. 
126. Janis et al., supra note 124, at 174. 
127. Id. 
128. BECHILLON, supra note 71, at 40. 
129. HABERMAS, supra note I, at 25; THE INVENTION OF TRADmON (Eric Hobsbawrn & Terrence 
Ranger eds., 2004); ERIC HOBSBA WM, NATIONS ETNA TIONALISME D PUIS 1780 (1992) ( discussing national 
and nationalist ideas in relation to tradition); MORIN,supra note 3, at 131; Yasuki Onuma, When Was the 
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relied more directly on the ideas developed by Antoine Garapon and Ioannis 
Papadopoulos 130 on the notion of dynamic legal culture. The central idea of these 
writers is that "it is necessary to contrast a deterministic conception of culture with a 
more dynamic vision, as much concerned with its unity as by its internal divisions and 
tensions." 131 
Within the idea of a national legal culture resides always the fact that every legal 
culture is the result in part of a certain ''tradition," which has been historically 
constructed over time. 132 It is primarily this concept of ''tradition" that must be 
compared. We must transcend the classical conception of an immobile and sanctified 
tradition, petrified in its past, which supports an exclusively static conception of 
cultural differences regarding international law. 133 Such a conception is patently 
dangerous and more importantly does not fully take into account the contemporary 
reality of the phenomenon. Eric Hobsbawm has gone so far as to speak of ''the 
invention oftraditions." 134 The specific traditions, continental formalism and Anglo-
Saxon pragmatism, which are at the foundation of French and American cultural 
conceptions, seem, in this light, to be able to be understood differently-that is, as 
imposing nothing and in no way objectively or deterministically constraining our 
discourse as French and Americans, but simply as advancing-or hindering--certain 
evolutions in thought-if not of law itself. 135 As a result, there exist many different 
legal cultures and specific French and American conceptions of international law, but 
they must be considered to be unstable, not necessarily coherent, and susceptible to 
evolution by challenge and discussion. The domestic legal cultures and the traditions 
that have produced them have been impacted by the development of communications 
and the interpenetration of normative regimes, as well as by globalization; they have 
become mutually permeable and intersect more and more to the benefit ofinternational 
law. 136 Legal cultures and traditions have also experienced internal evolutions, often 
paradoxical and complex, which prevent us from reducing them to the homogeneous 
and reductionist conception of a single explanatory model. Finally, the contemporary 
evolution oflegal thought towards hermeneutics and critical reasoning has profoundly 
altered the way we describe our legal cultures to ourselves. Nevertheless, we continue 
to identify legal cultures with a conservative and backward-looking tradition of thought 
by focusing solely on their traditional aspects. To do so can constitute a real epistemo-
logical obstacle to the rethinking of fundamental legal conceptions. 
Law of International Society Born?: An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an 
lntercivilizational Perspective, 2 J. HIST. INT'L L. 1 (2000). 
130. GARAPON & PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 29, at 23-7. 
131. Id. at 23. 
132. See OLENN,supra note 13; W ARNIER,supra note 3, at 6-14. For additional analysis, see also PAUL 
RICOUER, HISTOIRE ET VERITE 297 ( 1955), which distinguishes between civilizations (accretion over time) 
and cultures ("a law ofloyalties and creation"). 
133. On the old conception of tradition, see GLENN, supra note I 3, at 23; C. Atias, Presence de la 
tradition juridique, 22 REVUE DE LA RECHERCHE JURIDIQUE 389 ( 1997). 
134. HOBSBAWM, supra note 29, at 1-14. 
135. GARAPON & PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 29, at 24. 
136. See generally, RON $COLLON & SUZANNE WONG SCOLLON, INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION: 
A DISCOURSE APPROACH (1995). 
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Before undertaking a more dynamic examination of legal cultures, I want to 
delimit more precisely French and American conceptions ofinternational law by talcing 
into account three factors: 
I) Internal renewal is characteristic of all traditions oflegal thought. By preferring 
today to view legal cultures as creating a dynamic process, we now see that there are 
possibilities for renewal and adaptation to what is new because legal cultures draw 
upon both the past and the present, as well as both subjective and objective 
components. This does not mean that the principle of renewal of the legal tradition is 
an end in itself-which would indeed be a real contradiction-but simply that a 
tradition/conception can effectively produce something new and renew the contents of 
internationalist thought. 137 To assess the extent to which such an adaptation is possible, 
one can try to analyze what in a particular tradition/conception of international law 
moves it forward and what immobilizes it by looking at the interplay of present-day 
political, economic, and doctrinal forces.138 For example, the particular policies of 
such and such a government, French or American, can be examined with respect to 
their legal cultures and traditions to see whether the legal culture allows the 
development of such policies, or whether it seems to immobilize them or even cause 
them to retrogress. 
The stakes are high, if not decisive, because these policy choices challenge 
doctrinal or professional legal conservatism. A classic conception produces the 
illusion of a non-contradictory, coherent point of view without real dissidence, 139 which 
in effect claims to be an objective portrayal oflaw, and which is most often based on 
an identification between legal culture and national identity.140 Such a conception can 
then serve manipulative purposes of all sorts and can be resorted to by people for 
exclusive nationalist, colonialist, or imperialist ends. In France, for example, this 
approach, in terms of a national conception or tradition, was at one time privileged, but 
then later abandoned. In 1905, the internationalist F. Despagnet said: 
We have to create a French school of the law of nations. Our side can gain much by 
it without anyloss of impartiality. The spirit ofreason and justice which characterizes 
our race will permit us to maintain that the defense of our legitimate interests imbues 
us more than all others perhaps with a clear notion of law coupled with the firm will 
to respect and to serve it. 141 
Assertions of this type have, happily, totally disappeared today. They can be explained 
by the period and the context in which they were made. It is a conception which has 
little by little fallen into disuse because of the growing influence of the sociology of 
law and of legal positivism, which have made the idea of legal culture much less 
relevant as an element oflaw. But the cure has undoubtedly been too radical. 
In the United States, on the other hand, the idea of legal culture has remained 
present, but it is today used in a strongly nationalist context which can even accentuate 
its classical, static representation. These observations are directed to the American 
137. PRESTON KING, THINKING PAST A PROBLEM: EsSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 56 (2000). 
138. GARAPON & PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 129. 
139. Id. 
140. On "identity strategies," see CUCHE, supra note 12, at 92. 
141. f. DESPAGNET, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC VI (3d ed. 1905). 
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neo-conservative school of thought that has developed a "nationalist conception of 
international law," in the words of Alexandre Lorite Escorihuela, 142 in which the 
elements of the American legal tradition are presented in an extremely conservative 
way. 
2) We must remember the history oflegal traditions and cultures. To envision the 
French and American cultural conceptions of international law in dynamic terms leads 
to viewing the influence of the past on the present and the way in which the past 
conditions, although without actually determining, the present-day views of 
international lawyers. The work of H. Patrick Glenn on different legal traditions 
perfectly illustrates this phenomenon. 143 An historical perspective, might better clarify 
and enable us to understand French and American universalisms with respect to human 
rights. In France, for example, as a result of disillusionment with Europe's colonial 
past, the defense of universalism ofhuman rights has become somewhat tentative. The 
defense of universalism by the United States, on the other hand, has become dogmatic, 
quasi-missionary, and capable of being imposed by force, if need be. 144 
3) We must also consider the internal divisions and the external permeability of 
all legal cultures. It must be emphasized at the outset that there never exists a single 
legal culture or a single legal tradition for any given society, but a dominant legal 
culture and a minor legal culture, as I have already tried to show, as well as other legal 
cultures that exist side-by-side, are subsidiary, internal, and even legal counter-
cultures. 145 A legal culture can never be viewed in isolation; it defines itself only 
through its opposition to other legal cultures. 146 And it is this last point that I would 
like to stress with respect to Franco-American cultural differences. It would be 
therefore very difficult to isolate any particular French legal tradition without linking 
it to the German or British traditions. In the same way, one cannot understand the legal 
tradition of the United States without considering the way in which it has been 
constructed relative not only to English culture but also in relation to South American 
and Canadian cultures, 147 and vice-versa. Of course, the French and American legal 
traditions have been constructed since the 18th century in opposition to each other, 
rooting themselves in cultural universes that are close, but yet different. The 
ambivalent construction of the French and American identities in opposition to each 
other also explains their constant permeability. 
Confrontation between legal cultures does not mean perpetual competition or 
systematic opposition. There are as many points of convergence as differences 
between different conceptions of international law and it is important not to overlook 
142. Escorihuela, supra note 108. 
143. GLENN, supra note 13, at 12. 
144. See Pierre Rosanvallon, Europe-Etats-Unis: /es deux universa/ismes, LE MONDE, Feb. 22, 2005. 
145. GLENN, supra note 13, at 343 (applying these terms to legal culture). See also the similar idea of 
"counter-tradition," developed in COUNTER-TRADITION: A READER IN THE LITERATURE OF DISSENT AND 
ALTERNATIVES (Sheila Delany ed., 1971 ). On the different legal sub-cultures in France, see JOHN BELL, 
FRENCH LEGAL CUL TURES (William Twining & Christopher McChudden eds., 200 I); and in the Anglo-
Saxon world, see JEREMY WALDRON, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, in THE RIGHTS 
OF MINORITY CULTURES 93-122 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995). 
146. Ngo Tu Lap, Jdentite culture/le: la relativite de la diversite, in DIVERSITE CULTURELLE T 
MONDIALISATION 82 (Autrement ed. 2004). 
147. See supra note 124, at 461. 
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them. They are the agents of change in the divisions between conceptions, as they 
transcend the fundamental divisions which seemingly exist between them. A searching 
analysis of these convergences between different legal cultures would thus show, it 
seems to me, that quite often the divisions have become internal to each culture and 
not external to these cultures; so that what we see today is a pluralism of legal 
divisions which transcend national frontiers and group together actors who come from 
different legal traditions. Is that not what present-day disagreements within both the 
United States and France demonstrate concerning, for example, the liberalization of 
international markets by means of the World Trade Organization, the inclusion of 
social clauses in commercial contracts, 148 the prisoners at Guantanamo, the 
International Criminal Court, 149 or the legality of armed intervention? Has not the idea 
ofa duty of humanitarian intervention, which was French at the outset, been taken up 
today in other terms by the Americans and has it not given rise to the same passionate 
controversies in each country? 150 Is not the nationalism of the American conception, 
which is widely rejected in France, also a matter of controversy in the United States to 
the point of raising questions as to whether it is really an element of American 
international legal culture? 151 Is this not also what even the most restrained (but also 
important) arguments reveal, concerning the application of international law in the 
domestic legal order which give rise to opposing views even within each country? 152 
Or academic disagreements on legal methodology and the relationship between 
formalism and realism? 153 Or the agreement of"liberals" concerning human rights, the 
desirability of democracy in states, and a cosmopolitan Kantian vision? Or discussions 
148. See SUZANNE BERGER, NOTRE PREMIERE MONO JALISA TION: LEc;;ONS D'UN ECHEC OUBLIE 67 (2003); 
Marcos Ancelovici, Organizing against Globalization: The Case of ATTAC in France, 30 POL. & Soc'Y 
427 (2002). 
149. See Benjamin Ferenz, Heed the Lesson of Nuremburg: Let No Nation Be Above the Law, Nov. 18, 
2005, http://www.forward.com/articles/6093. 
150. MARIO BETTATI & BERNARD KOUCHNER, LE DEVOIR D'INGERENCE HUMANITAJRE: P UT-ON LES 
LAISSER MOURIR? (1987). 
15 I. See Justice Kennedy's statement: "[N]ationalism or self-interest will obscure the greatness of 
American traditions." quoted in Charles Lane, The High Court Looks Abroad, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2005 
atA05. 
152. In France this debate took place mostly at the time of the construction of the European community 
and the resistance of French courts when faced with the prospect of the supremacy of community Jaw. It 
has been revived today in the United States by references made by the Supreme Court to European law and 
to international law. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
153. For a critical French internationalist positivist position in reaction to an excessive formalism of 
certain French writings, see Dupuy, supra note 16, at 30, 94. See also M. Waline, Empiricisme et 
conceptualisme dans la methode juridique: faut-i/ tuer /es categories juridiques?, in MELANGES EN 
L'HONNEUR DE JEAN DABIN Tome I at 359 (1963); D. de Bechillon, Porter atteinte aux categories 
anthropologiques fondamentales?, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE D DROIT CIVIL 4 7, 50 (2002). For questions 
concerning methodology on the American side, see for example, Harry T. Edwards, The Growing 
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Clark Byse, 
Legal Scholarship, Legal Realism and the Law Teacher's Intellectual Schizophrenia, 13 NOVA L. REV. 
9 (1988); Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, JOO HARV. 
L. REV. 761 (1987). See also KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 67, at 494. 
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on contemporary theories of justice which occur within each culture? 154 Or those 
among judges on the two sides of the Atlantic? 155 
All these questions clearly entail the taking of positions where arguments are 
intermixed and where barriers between the legal cultures of the two countries are 
removed. Is there not, in many specific respects and even more generally, a "constant 
tension" between the models of realism (in its instrumentalist form) and formalism, as 
Martti Koskenniemi suggests, which accompanies the possible interaction of the two 
cultures and their internal divisions? 156 Realism can never completely eliminate the 
formal rule and must recognize its positive role of "inclusion" and equality; and 
formalism can evolve only under the influence of a pragmatic and realistic search for 
rules better adapted to reality. 
In other words, once we admit that there is something inherent and perhaps 
irreconcilable in each legal tradition and legal culture at the level of privileged values, 
and once we accept the idea of two fundamental models, then we can see how 
international legal professionals, actors, and representatives of each of the two 
countries made their arguments which are based on their own legal traditions and at the 
same time converge to a great extent, thereby facilitating borrowings and intersections 
between the French and American models and traditions. As I have argued, because 
binary and static representations are so deeply rooted in the French and American 
mental landscapes, these actors are far from being consciously aware of what they are 
doing. Over and above the principal schools of thought, and of the paradigms which 
orient them in a general way, each country and each culture has evolved and is 
continually evolving from realism to formalism, from pragmatism to system building, 
from empiricism to rationalism, from casuistic judicial reasoning to legalistic 
reasoning, 157 et cetera, and vice versa. If I take the example of France, and of its 
professional milieu alone, nothing would be worse today, it seems to me, than to 
identify "the" French conception of international law with the sociological tradition 
that emerged from the school of Georges Scelle or, on the contrary, with the voluntarist 
tradition inaugurated by Jules Basdevant. 158 This would be to freeze an intellectual 
position, which in any event never existed as such, and to give a false impression of 
reality. Not only have these currents of thought always coexisted in one form or 
another, but they intersect today to a great extent, so that one can identify only with 
great difficulty a strictly sociological or voluntarist French tradition/conception of 
international law. Despite the unquestionable and almost constant influence of 
formalistic positivism, the French legal tradition has renewed itself in more nuanced 
forms than might appear. 
154. See JACQUES LENOBLE & ANDRE BERTEN, DIRE LA NORME: DROIT POLITIQUE T ENONCIATION 
(1990). 
155. See,e.g.,JUDGESINCONTEMPORARYDEMOCRACY:ANINTERNATIONALCONVERSATION(ROBERT 
BADINTER & STEPHEN BREYER eds., 2004). 
l 56. Koskenniemi, supra note 34, at 89 ( contrasting the "culture of instrumentalism" with the "culture 
of formalism," but in terms that seem to me to be well adapted to the French and American models). 
I 57. On the importance oflegislation in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, see Ana Peyro Llopis, 
La place du droit international dans la jurisprudence recente de la Cour supreme des Etats-Unis, 109 
R.G.D.I.P. 16 (2005). 
l 58. Although in their times they inaugurated or consolidated specific ways of conceiving international 
law. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 67, at 266. 
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As for American schools of thought about international law, it would be just as 
absurd to reduce the present American conception to the realist tradition inaugurated 
by Myres S. McDougal or conversely, to that of American legal process of Abram 
Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich, and Andreas F. Lowenfeld. David Kennedy has well 
demonstrated how the discourse of American international lawyers is linked over time 
and the interactions of different currents of thought produce major cycles of 
enthusiasm and distrust vis-a-vis international law. 159 In any event, the contemporary 
American discipline of international law is witnessing an unbelievable vitality and 
inventiveness, which can only increase its conceptions and also its divisions about 
international law, none of which the external legal policies of the present government 
can obscure. Are not diversity and plurality moreover two of the most notable 
characteristics of American society and culture? 160 
To best comprehend these changing divisions, both internal and external, we must 
bear in mind their continual movement and the fact that this movement can involun-
tarily~r not-mask deeper divisions (that are also in motion). To be more precise, 
let us say that the external divisions that we erect between the French/continental and 
the American/ Anglo-Saxon conceptions exist, but in a changeable, attenuated, and 
nuanced way. Moreover, let us say that these divisions are clearly less important than 
the divisions that are continually reforming and opposing the western tradition to a 
non-western tradition. That, without doubt, is much more worrisome and important for 
the whole world. 
C. The "Reflective Appropriation " of Legal Cultures 
The legal cultures of France and the United States have to be viewed in a dynamic 
context, one which highlights their divisions and their intersections, as much as their 
unity and their opposition to each other. This would assist us in better understanding 
their true natures and their interactions. It is their interactions, however, which permit 
them to retain their identity, as they confront each other. Also, they continue to remain 
unique unto themselves. From this uniqueness flows cultural conflicts with respect to 
the creation, the interpretation, and the application of norms of international law that 
have to be resolved. But how? 
Why is this question of cultural division so important with respect to an entire 
society's relationship to law and its representation of international law? Why is it, 
perhaps that in essence, it is more important than that of political or economic divisions 
between our two countries? As Jurgen Habermas has already so well shown, it is 
undoubtedly because culture corresponds to one part of the identity and the personality 
159. See David Kennedy, The Twentieth-Century Discipline of International Law in the United States, 
in LooKING BACK AT LA W'S CENTURY 386 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002); David Kennedy, When Renewal 
Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 335 (2000). The studies of David 
Kennedy also rely on the idea of an internal structure of discourse among internationalists, which encloses 
them in language games, of reciprocal arguments and counter-arguments, which precludes any definitive 
and insular conception of international law. This argument is seductive and convincing with the evidence 
it adduces oflanguage games within the discipline of international law. However, we will not pursue it to 
its logical conclusion, as it would prevent us from taking a reflective and critical position in relation to this 
field of argumentation. 
160. LHERM, supra note 33, at 101. 
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of every individual: "Cultures form identities and wholly permeate personality struc-
tures. "161 Legal cultures also participate in the construction of everyone's identity by 
occupying a place sufficiently central within the general cultures of our two 
countries. 162 If cultures form identities, it has two critical consequences that are 
interrelated. 
First, it follows from this that cultural conflicts are also existential conflicts that 
revolve around values, as opposed to conflicts of interest. 163 Consequently, nothing 
would be more dangerous than to reduce these conflicts to questions of foreign policy 
or to simple economic interests, because, in so doing, the more we would like to ignore 
them the more they are going to reappear and seek to assert themselves. The question 
of organically modified food, for example, cannot simply be reduced to a commercial 
question between Europe (including France) and the United States. Behind the 
important economic stakes, the culture of risk differs profoundly on the two sides of 
the Atlantic. Therefore, this question cannot be resolved by way of commercial 
negotiations alone. 164 It is the same for access to medicine by developing countries. 
The question of reconciling the need to provide medicine in case of pandemics and the 
protection of patent rights is evidently tied to extremely important commercial 
interests, but highlights also different conceptions of property, freedom, and aid to 
developing countries that one can envision culturally very differently, either by means 
of a charitable conception (the United States) or by means of a redistributive solidarity 
conception (France). In other words, we really have to take into account the cultural 
conflicts (including conflicts oflegal cultures) that are hidden behind commercial and 
political conflicts in order to know how to respond appropriately to them. 
Second, the upshot is that these cultural conflicts cannot be resolved by means of 
negotiation or simply by one nation adopting the solution of the other, but by means 
of"reflective appropriation." 165 This insight of Jurgen Habermas seems to me to be 
fundamental. It is philosophical in nature and is based on a deep, critical appreciation 
of the value of traditions and cultures. 166 Habermas' insight also demonstrates that we 
cannot resolve problems oflegal culture at the international level in the same way as 
other types of conflicts, and that it is essential for international lawyers to seek 
solutions at the level of training, education, and teaching. We have to learn to identify 
legal cultures so as to better adapt ourselves to them, but perhaps also at times to 
temper our enthusiasm for them. I realize that what I am suggesting is the idea of 
assuming a critical stance toward the traditional legal culture of each country with the 
possibility of selectively rejecting certain aspects of it and retaining others. What I am 
recommending, then, is a critical and rationalist position, which will not necessarily be 
viewed favorably by everyone. 167 I want to reiterate that in adopting this stance, I am 
16 I. HABERMAS, supra note 95, at 218. 
162. Pierre Lagrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 52, 57 
(1996). 
163. HABERMAS, supra note 95, at 218. 
164. See supra note 7, at 208; PASCAL LAMY, LA DEMOCRATIE·MONDE: POUR UNE AUTRE 
GOUVERNANCE GLOBALE 62 (2004). 
165. HABERMAS, supra note 95, at 235. 
166. HABERMAS, supra note I, at 25. 
167. What I am suggesting is the adoption of the "rationalist tradition." On this well-known question, 
see Karl Popper, Toward a Rational Theory of Tradition, in KARL POPPER, CONJECfURES AND 
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not trying to give a strictly cultural explanation of the Franco-American division with 
respect to international law, but only to fully restore this perspective-along side the 
other explanations which are more often advanced-to account for the competing 
conceptions of the two countries concerning international law. 
D. "Shared Legal Culture" and "Common Historical Memory" 
To explore this idea in more depth, I want to pursue here certain paths for 
reflection that Jean-Marc Ferry has proposed for Europe, and to add several practical 
comments. We know what Europe is today; it is not a model, but rather a "laboratory" 
for the integration and intersection of national legal cultures. 168 However, despite 
several integrated legal systems at the regional level (the European Union, the 
European Court of Human Rights), the question of legal cultures remains a real 
problem, which is becoming even more dramatic between East and West. Confronted 
with conflicts which arise between European states, Jean-Marc Ferry has proposed the 
practice of a "shared political culture" and of the development of a "common historical 
memory." 169 
For the idea of"shared political culture," I would substitute that of shared legal 
culture, that is, the effort to develop an "amalgam" of the legal cultures of each 
country. This amalgam does not mean the adoption of a common policy, like that 
deemed desirable at the level of the European community, but simply that our different 
cultural ways of thinking about international law can be understood in the dynamic way 
that I have already described, that is, in their complex interrelation with each other. 
In so doing, they would have to be reconsidered and debated in the context of 
reflection, understanding, and deliberation. Writings would have to be translated, read, 
and used. The idea of "a common historical memory" is just as fundamental at the 
international level. It would proceed by a self-critical examination of one's own past, 
"by the teaching of the historical experiences of nations and by the recognition of the 
multiple forms of violence that they have inflicted on each other." How can we not see 
at the present time that this "mutual opening of national memories" is critical for the 
whole world? 170 Relating more specifically to the theme of this article, how can we not 
see that the historical memory common to France and the United States can be better 
understood, studied, and taught. even though both countries have revisited their 
common past many times, but almost always with a total lack of understanding of the 
perspectives of the other? Let us think about the second Iraq war and the accusations 
of"appeaser" leveled against the French by the Americans. The ''teaching of memory" 
has become indispensable to jurists today in the context of a globalized society, which 
paradoxically, encourages the clash of national cultures. 171 Even a hegemonic 
REFUTATIONS 120-21 (1969); Al.AsDAIR MACINTYRE, QUELLE JUSTICE? QUELLE RATIONALITE 375 (M. 
Vignaux d'Hollande trans., 1988). 
168. M. Delmas-Marty, Comparative Law and International Law: Methods for Ordering Pluralism, U. 
TOKYO J. L. & POL. (forthcoming in 2006). 
169. JEAN-MARC FERRY, L'EUROPE, L' AMERIQUE T LE MONDE 29 (2004 ). 
170. Id. at 32. See Anthony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law and 
Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflict, in METHODS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 186 (Steven R. Ratner 
& Anne-Marie Slaughter eds., 2004) (expressing this viewpoint by third-world, Latin American writers). 
171. As Habermas points out, only history can lead to a true reflective distance with traditions, with our 
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superpower like the United States cannot do without being receptive to this common 
history ( as well as to the shared legal culture), because it would then underestimate the 
capacity for reaction by other cultures and their even stiffer resistance. 
E. Limited Interdisciplinary Education and the Methodology of Comparative Law 
One can draw very concrete conclusions from these two ideas and from the 
necessity of"reflective appropriation." I will limit my discussion here, in my capacity 
as university professor, to teaching in the academy and legal methodology. It seems 
to me absolutely necessary that there be instruction in shared historical memory and 
legal culture (broadly conceived to include all cultural phenomena) within the 
discipline of international law. It would seem desirable that we open the discipline of 
international law to history and to different legal cultures if we accept the idea that 
national conceptions and legal cultures are significant influences on international law. 
In addition, it is not only the legal cultures of others, but also one's own legal culture, 
that it is necessary to study and to examine critically. This would surely have a 
paradoxical effect on the teaching ofinternational law in France and the United States. 
It would be necessary to break down the walls of international legal education in 
France by including a course in "History, Legal Cultures, and International Law" or 
in "Legal Traditions and International Law." Conversely, it would be necessary in the 
United States to limit those courses that are already taught in an interdisciplinary way, 
and to refocus them on fundamental legal doctrines. 
It would also be necessary to add a course in comparative law as a methodology 
to complement the course in history and legal culture. Can the international lawyer of 
today avoid being a comparativist? For a long time, comparative law has had little 
relevance for international law; the comparativist not seeing an object of study in a 
single law or a single legal system. This is reflected in the well-known views of Sir 
Hersch Lauterpacht and H.C. Gutteridge. 172 But globalization, the frequent interpene-
tration of domestic, transnational, and international legal orders, fragmentation 
between a variety of general and regional international legal regimes, and now the 
return in force of particular national and cultural perspectives all call for comparative 
education. In the association of comparative law and international law so lucidly 
recommended by Mireille Delmas-Marty, 173 is there not a basis for the solution of what 
we perhaps better perceive today and what might lead us to a better understanding of 
international law as it is presently evolving? Perhaps it could even be one of the 
elements of the solution to the problem posed in the introduction to this Article-that 
own legal traditions, and the legal traditions of others. HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 25. 
172. H.C. GUTIERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE METHOD OF 
LEGAL STUDY & RESEARCH (2d ed. 1971 ); H. Lauterpacht, The So-called Anglo-American and Continental 
Schools of Thought in International Law, 12 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 31 (1931), cited in L. Amede Obiora, 
Toward an Auspicious Reconciliation o/International and Comparative Analyses, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 669, 
671-72 & n.4 (1998). 
173. Delmas-Marty, supra note 168. See also Mireille Delmas-Marty, Comparative Law and the 
Internationalisation of law in Europe, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 24 7 
(Marek Hoecke ed., 2004) (explaining, with reference to European law and international law, the 
phenomena of legal "hybridization" and "harmonization"); Mireille DELMAS-MARTY, LE RELATIF ET 
L'UNIVERSEL (2d ed. 2004); Mireille DELMAS-MARTY, UN PLURALISME ORDONNE (forthcoming in 2006). 
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of the fate of our common legal heritage since 1945. We are not able to fully develop 
here the consequences of this association with respect to law itself, but we can at least 
perhaps comment on its bearing on legal cultures. If behind the same body of 
international legal rules-both written and unwritten-are hidden the same great 
cultural differences, comparative law can help us to harmonize interpretation by 
assisting in the understanding and the comparison of the legal cultures and national 
conceptions of each. The utilization of comparative law as a methodology would allow 
us to apply in practice the "reflective appropriation" of legal cultures. In truth, this 
type ofreflection and the association oflaw and culture is a longtime characteristic of 
the comparative method, 174 which has been greatly refined, often very pragmatically, 
in the area of human rights. It should then simply be extended to the whole field of 
international law, which, over and above the problem of human rights, remains deeply 
dependent on different cultural contexts. 
Although comparison seems to me to be necessary, I am not here to advocate a 
strictly cosmopolitan conception of law, as I have discussed elsewhere. 175 Nor am I 
here to advocate for the standardization of cultures or their dissolution in a possible 
world legal culture. If one really takes seriously the idea that culture, including legal 
culture, lies at the foundation of personal identity and that each culture evolves in 
constant interaction with others, the idea of a world legal culture is frightening because 
of its solvent and totalizing, if not totalitarian, aspect, since it means the complete 
absence of pluralism. It is the same, a fortiori, for all imperialist claims of particular 
national conceptions. "To ask a state or a people to give up its collective preferences 
is de facto to exclude it from the international system." 176 Even with respect to the 
interpretation of the domestic law of each state, the knowledge of the legal cultures of 
others can lead to an interpretation of one's own law with a better understanding of 
what makes one's own legal culture special or what aspects ofit should be rejected. 
Was this not well demonstrated by Justice Stephen Breyer with respect to the public 
financing of religious schools, and Justice Anthony Kennedy with respect to the 
imposition of the death penalty on rninors? 177 Similarly, the existence of different 
cultural conceptions of international law is not something to regret; on the contrary, it 
can be a source of continual emulation and of positive transmission of different legal 
experiences to the international and transnational levels. One can perhaps go even 
further and think that if these legal cultures have really become interdependent, any 
loss to one would be a loss for others, too. It would then be necessary to adapt the 
legal cultures of others to one's own to understand their degrees of divergence, the 
reasons for their incompatibility, and their points of convergence. 
174. The use of the comparative method in this context has given rise to numerous debates. For 
opposing views, see Legrand, supra note 162, at 52 (1996); and H. Patrick Glenn, La civilisation de 
common law, 45 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 559 (1993). 
I 75. It seems to me that one can think about the future in terms of the "well-ordered pluralism" and 
"common law" of Delmas-Marty, but on the condition of respecting the related existence of the tryptique 
of states/regions, international law, and globalized law. See Emmanuelle Jouannet, L 'idee de communaute 
humaine a la croisee de la communaute des £tats et de la communaute mondiale, 47 ARCHIVES DE 
PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 191 (2003). 
176. LAMY,supranote 164,at63. 
177. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Roperv. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005). 
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Comparison can lead to the harmonization of points of view, but also to the 
acceptance of differences in order to fully restore the salubrious interplay of political 
forces at the international level by providing a better understanding of the choices 
which must be made together. To decide how to reconcile two different cultural 
perspectives on law with respect to a particular problem is in effect to return to the 
critical question of political choice. We should no longer confuse the values that can 
emerge from the interaction oflegal cultures with the policies which states must pursue 
at the international level. The lessons of shared history and the "reflective appropria-
tion" of cultures can assist us in making choices, but they cannot replace political 
debate on the best way to move forward together. It is there that political debate 
begins and asserts its primacy. 178 Some will consider that this choice can only be made 
by the imposition of one's own values, but others-myselfincluded-might think that 
we can also engage in collective choices. 179 And perhaps we will finally be able to 
attain that "diverse" identity 180 to which many today aspire. 
In any event, this requires that international lawyers be willing to reconceptualize 
international law as a multi-cultural and historical phenomenon, not just as a tool at the 
disposition of each party (the American view) or simply a formal rule (the French 
view); and to integrate this understanding into their ways of practicing, thinking about, 
and teaching international law. The refusal to consider the historical, cultural, 
pluralistic, dialectic, and paradoxical dimensions of international law is perhaps at 
bottom what most unites the French and Americans today, and in this they are 
neglecting essential aspects of international law. In so doing, they are led into 
recurring impasses and useless conflicts, and, as is still the case today, into a sterile 
lack of understanding of each other's perspectives on international law. 
178. See Thomas Ferenczi, Le passe revisite, LE MONDE, Feb. 3, 2006, at 2. 
179. Id. 
180. Alain Renaut, Conclusion, 441 HISTOJRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE POLITIQUE: LES CRITIQUES DE LA 
MODERNITE ( 1999). 
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